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ABSTRACT 
The provision of military and armed security services typically is the monopoly domain 
of the state. With the end of the Cold War legitimate private firms, however, expanded as 
worldwide providers of military and security services. The proliferation of private 
military companies echoes back to pre-modern eras when it was customary for state rulers 
to allocate force and security through the market. This study therefore aims to explore and 
explain the rapid rise of transnational corporate military service provision in our time, and 
to ground this change process historically by exploring the economic history of private 
military service provision. Historically this study primarily addresses private military 
service provision during Medieval and Early Modern periods. During these eras state and 
local rulers relied on contractual institutions to employ military companies and other 
private military actors. To explain the rise of private military service provision in our time 
this study explores global institutional changes, national institutional arrangements and 
military privatization paths, and the proliferation of transnational private military 
companies. This study demonstrates that the capacity of the modern state to control, 
sanction and exercise legitimate violence has not diminished, but it has rather been 
transformed by the resurgence of contractual arrangements under new post-Cold War 
institutions. Today modern states control private military companies through formal rules 
and informal norms, competition constraints, and through informal ties between public 
sector and military officials and entrusted private military firm executives. Modern states 
that are able to provide security as a public good primarily hire military service firms to 
augment regular forces and public security provision. The substitution of public security 
and military force resurfaced in weak states as a short-term response to armed conflicts, 
political instabilities, and humanitarian crises. Overall this change underlines a partial 
return to contractual institutions in public security and military provision. While military 
privatization has served to augment the regular military structure and has contributed to 
reduce many peacetime military costs the resurgence of contractual institutions has 
amplified transaction costs due to the ensuing demand for efficient contract management 
practises and the intrinsic need for new efficient military contract management structures. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Providing national security and controlling violence is widely perceived as the 
cornerstone responsibility of the nation-state. Sociologist Max Weber (1964) 
underlined that the very defining characteristic of the modern state is its legitimate 
use of violence – i.e. the sanctioning, control, and use of physical force. Weber 
(1964: 154) declared that the state “successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force in enforcement of its order”. The modern 
state not only centralized and monopolized coercion within its territorial borders, 
but as well enforced its control by delegitimizing non-state violence in the 
international system (Thomson, 1996: 3-4). Economic historian Douglass C. 
North (1981: 21) in his research about the development of Western economies 
notes that the state maintains a “comparative advantage in violence” as its 
inherent role is to maintain order and to specify and enforce property rights. In 
economic theory national defense and security is moreover upheld as a rare 
defining example of a perfectly non-excludable and non-rivalled good – a so 
called “pure public good” (Stiglitz, 2000: 132). Normatively stout privatization 
proponents, such as radical libertarians, even refrain from contesting the public 
monopoly of force (Singer, 2003: 7-8). In 1998 UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan stated that on a prior occasion he had considered hiring private sector 
contractors to secure a Rwandan refugee camp, but this course of action was 
evaded as he interpreted “the world may not be ready to privatize peace” (UN, 
1998). 
     In 2003 the US-led war in Iraq, however, was readily described as the first 
“privatized war” (Mathiason, 2003). During the same year the “Guardian” 
reported that “private corporations have penetrated western warfare so deeply that 
they are now the second biggest contributor to coalition forces in Iraq after the 
Pentagon” (Traynor, 2003). As of early 2008, according to a report by the US 
“Congressional Budget Office” (CBO), more than 190 000 contractors, including 
subcontractors, were employed in Iraq under US-funded contracts (CBO, 2008: 
8). The CBO (2008: 8) moreover notes that the ratio of US-funded private 
contractor to US-military personnel in Iraq is 1 to 1. If we consider the scale of the 
Iraq War and the following reconstruction process this is the most extensive 
military engagement of hired civilian personnel in US-military history. In the 
same report it is also estimated that between 25 000 to 30 000 security contractors 
in Iraq were hired by private military and security service firms. The US-
administration directly employed between 30 to 40 percent of these contractors 
(CBO, 2008: 12). Some of the companies that were contracted in Iraq, such as 
US-firm “Blackwater” and UK-firm “ArmorGroup International”, were as well 
employed by the public and the private sectors to provide security services in New 
Orleans following the devastation of hurricane “Katrina” (Witte, 2005). Peter 
Singer (2003: 18), a “Brookings Institution” Director and renowned expert in this 
interdisciplinary research field, suggests a pattern is emerging whereby 
individuals, companies, states, and international organizations no longer only rely 
on public security and military service provision, but as well depend on 
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corporations that are competing worldwide to obtain military and armed security 
service contracts. Deborah Avant, also a leading researcher in this field, in fact 
refers to a transnational “market for force” that exists alongside state systems and 
state forces (Avant, 2005: 3). 
     The rapid expansion of privately provided military services and armed security 
has inescapably confronted formal rules and informal norms. Economist Paul 
Krugman in his “New York Times” column for example states: “... the so-called 
private security contractors are mercenaries. They’re heavily armed. They carry 
out military missions, but they’re private employees who don’t answer to military 
discipline. On the other hand, they don’t seem to be accountable to Iraqi or U.S. 
law, either. And they behave accordingly” (Krugman, 2007). The antagonists of 
this trend indeed refer to private military service firms as mercenary organizations 
in corporate disguise (Percy, 2007: 12). This critique most recently escalated 
following several scandals relating to the conduct, operational procedures, and 
accountability of contractors in Iraq. Private contractors for example participated 
in the interrogations at the infamous “Abu Ghraib” prison where detainees were 
tortured (Kwok, 2006: 36). In 2005 the “Observer” published a Blackwater 
company-memo that stated: “actually, it is ‘fun’ to shoot people” (Townsend, 
2005). Companies such as “Hart Group”, “Control Risks”, and “Triple Canopy” 
have been engaged in several armed clashes with Iraqi insurgents (Kwok, 2006: 
35), and on September 16th, 2007, Blackwater employees shot and killed 
seventeen and wounded twenty-four civilians in “Nisour Square”, Baghdad 
(Glanz & Rubin, 2007). These and other scandals have generated worldwide 
media attention and consequently shaped a negative public perception of the rising 
private military service industry. In both research and media publications the 
critical perspectives of political philosopher and practitioner Niccolo Machiavelli 
are regularly revisited to historically ground discontent or caution about profit-
driven non-state military service providers. Machiavelli (1999: 39-40) for 
example stated the following: 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To classify military service firms as mercenary organizations, however, is 
analytically complicated. In international law a mercenary is defined as an 
individual that is recruited to fight in armed conflict for personal profit, that is not 
a national of the conflicting parties, and that has not been sent by a state that is not 
“Mercenaries are disunited, thirsty for power, undisciplined and disloyal; 
they are brave among their friends and cowards before the enemy; they 
have no fear of God, they do not keep faith with their fellow men; they 
avoid defeat just so long as they avoid battle; in peacetime they are 
despoiled by them, and in wartime by the enemy. Surely no one can be 
called a good man who, in order to support himself, takes up a profession 
that obliges him at all times to be rapacious, fraudulent, and cruel, as of 
course must be all of those – no matter what their rank – who make a 
trade of war”. 
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part of the armed conflict (Wulf, 2005: 52). Mercenaries hold no legal rights, and 
their operations are thus criminalized. The rising private military service industry 
during the post-Cold War era, in contrast, signifies the emergence of private 
military service providers that are legally registered as corporations (Singer, 2003: 
45). Many of these companies have executives, shareholders, holding companies 
and subsidisers. Some military service firms are part of “Fortune 500” 
conglomerates (Holmqvist, 2005: 4). Nowadays even the UN and NGOs hire 
security services from such companies to protect humanitarian missions in volatile 
regions (Avant, 2005: 7). While mercenaries strive to conceal their activities the 
private military industry firms are registered, pay taxes, and compete for contracts 
worldwide (Wulf, 2005: 50). These companies moreover do not predominantly 
carry out combat missions. On the contrary, their activities cover a diverse range 
of military and security services – such as protecting and transporting state 
officials, protecting strategic sites, building and maintaining military facilities, 
military logistics, demining, military consulting and training, and support services 
for advanced weapon systems (Kinsey, 2006: 2-3; Avant, 2005: 18-20). 
     At the beginning of the new millennium it was estimated that the annual 
market revenue in this industry averaged USD 100 billion, and it is further 
estimated that this revenue level will double by the year 2010 (Avant, 2005: 8). 
While there is an astounding expansion of privately provided military services in 
our time the market provision of such services is not historically unique. On the 
contrary, it was customary and often necessary for ancient as well as for pre-
modern state rulers to employ private military and security providers. During the 
early modern period the military industry developed into a leading capitalist 
industry in Europe. Entrepreneurs such as Albrecht von Wallenstein controlled 
great private military forces, and entrepreneurs such as Bernard von Sachsen-
Weimar as well leased armies and navies to state rulers (Singer, 2003: 28). 
History demonstrates that non-state violence dominated the international system, 
and military and security services were regularly bought and sold as commodities 
(Thomson, 1996: 3). The significance and influence of legitimate private actors 
and organizations in armed conflict is in fact as old as war itself. The conventional 
perception of war as a collective endeavour by public armies for shared benefit, 
Singer (2003: 19) notes, is thus an idealisation. The consolidation of the modern 
state system fragmented the market-based provision of force, but due to new 
institutional arrangements, worldwide socio-political destabilizations, and 
economic change in the post-Cold War era firms emerged to provide military 
services worldwide. The rapid rise and transnational scope of the private military 
service industry in our time is historically unprecedented, but at the same time we 
are witnessing a resurgence of private military service provision. If our ambition 
is to understand and explain the rise of corporate military service provision we 
therefore need to as well analytically address the economic history of private 
military service provision. 
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1.1 Research Aim 
 
Private military and security service providers have been hired by states since 
ancient eras to augment or to substitute the public provision of force and security. 
While such practises and arrangements diminished with the rise of the modern 
state system many states during the post-Cold War era increasingly started to rely 
on the market and contractual institutions to augment or substitute the public 
provision of military and security services. The primary aim of this study 
therefore is to explore and explain the rise of corporate military service provision 
in our time. In order to historically ground this economic change the aim of this 
study is also to explore the contractual institutions that enabled the pre-modern 
market provision of military and security services. The main research questions in 
this study therefore are: 
 
- Why did an expansion of corporate military service provision emerge during 
the post-Cold War era? 
 
- How does the rise of corporate military service provision compare to private 
military service provision in pre-modern eras?  
 
 
1.2 Delimitations 
 
The private and profit-driven provision of military services is a controversial 
topic. It addresses the foundational legitimacy of the state, and the extent of 
private sector service provision. The aim of this study is not to engage in such 
topics nor to evaluate legal frameworks or to present normative accounts for or 
against military privatization. The aim of this study is rather to explore and 
explain the rise of corporate military service provision in our time, and to ground 
and demystify this change by as well exploring the economic history of private 
military service provision. The market for military services is transnational, but 
foremost the USA, the UK, and South Africa have variably influenced the global 
rise of a private military service provision. This study therefore primarily explores 
the institutional frameworks in these countries, the corporations that originated in 
these countries, and the influence they project/projected on the worldwide 
provision and rise of private military services. The resurgence of private military 
service provision constitutes a return to contractual institutions as a means to 
augment or substitute legitimate violence. Such contractual practices were 
initiated during the Middle Ages. The historical exploration of private military 
service provision therefore is limited to this period and the following early 
modern period. This study explores and analyzes the legitimate private military 
service industry, whereby mercenaries – i.e. illegitimate profit-driven non-state 
actors – are disregarded. Private military actors that were hired by states during 
history are thus continually referred to as private military service providers. 
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1.3 Disposition    
 
This study is comprised of seven chapters. In the following chapter the theoretical 
foundations of this study are outlined. The theoretical chapter defines and outlines 
the links between institutions and economic change, introduces and defines public 
and private goods, and outlines and defines private military service companies. 
The following chapter presents the methodology of this study. This chapter 
introduces the research design, material selection and critique, and the analytical 
framework. In the next chapter the economic history of private military service 
provision is explored. This chapter addresses the contractual institutions of private 
military and security provision during foremost medieval and early-modern 
periods. In the fifth chapter the rise of corporate military service provision during 
the post-Cold War era is explored as an institutional change processes on three 
interconnected levels – global, state and company. In the following chapter the 
findings in this study are analyzed and interpreted. The analysis focuses on the 
characteristics of the market for force in our time, and differentiates between 
private military provision that serves to augment public military and security 
provision in states that provide security as a public good, and private military and 
security service provision in weak states that serves to substitute public security 
and military force in the short-run. In the final chapter the findings in this study 
are summarized and concluded.  
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2 THEORY 
 
In this chapter the theoretical foundations in this study are outlined. Initially 
institutions are theoretically problematized, defined, and introduced as intrinsic to 
economic change. Subsequently public and private goods are theoretically 
differentiated, and finally private military service companies are outlined and 
defined. 
   
2.1 Institutions & Economic Change 
 
In orthodox economic theory the economy is outlined as inter-connected and self-
regulating markets that enable buyers and sellers to engage in mutually 
advantageous exchanges and that enable efficient allocations of scarce resources – 
without government intervention (Stillwell, 2002: 147). This neoclassical 
economic theory fundament presupposes that consumers strive to maximize 
utility, have access to perfect information and thereby make rational purchase 
decisions, while firms are presumed to act on perfectly competitive markets and 
strive to maximize profits by optimizing output as it is also assumed that firms can 
obtain perfect information about their production costs and market demand. The 
reliance on such static preconditions for market equilibriums to transpire 
sacrifices or discards the actual institutional conditions and historical processes 
that incited firms to emerge in the first place. In 1899 heterodox economist 
Thorstein Veblen initiated his contestation of the principal neoclassical “rational 
economic man” concept in his book “The Theory of the Leisure Class”. Veblen 
demonstrated how socially determined excess consumption behaviours serve to 
display social group belonging rather than utility maximization, and in effect 
produce waste rather than efficient resource allocations (Stillwell, 2002: 212-213). 
Although Veblen inspired the development of institutional economics (IE) other 
leading IE-scholars, such as John Commons and Wesley Mitchell, did not 
completely discard neoclassical economic theory (Hedlund, 2007: 65-66). During 
the first half of the twentieth century IE-researchers studied economic change 
phenomena that the neoclassical school could not sufficiently address – e.g. the 
expanding role of the government in economic affairs, the development of new 
influential financial organizations, the rise of trade unions, and the increasing 
power of corporations (Stillwell, 2002: 211). IE-research accordingly is concerned 
with empirical reality rather than abstract market equilibrium models, and social 
reality is approached as dynamic and evolutionary. Information is regarded as 
asymmetrical, and the enforcement of legal agreements is underlined as costly and 
imperfect (Stillwell, 2002: 210). 
     As a research tradition IE however did not develop a cohesive theoretical 
framework (Hedlund, 2007: 103). Commons (1931: 648) for example noted: “the 
difficulty in defining a field for the so-called institutional economics is the 
uncertainty of meaning of an institution“. With this challenge in mind scholars, 
such as Douglass C. North and Oliver Williamson, worked to further integrate IE 
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and orthodox economic theory. This research developed into the so called “New 
Institutional Economics” (NIE). NIE is grounded in economist Ronald Coase’s 
research that applies transaction cost theory as a fundament to explain why firms 
emerge. In his famous article “The nature of the firm” Coase (1937: 392) 
underlines that the operation of markets is costly, whereby firms arise to direct 
resources and reduce transaction costs. Transaction costs are the costs of human 
interaction and exchange. Such costs include economic costs – e.g. bargaining, 
collecting market information, and enforcing contracts – and political costs that 
emerge from establishing frameworks of rules and enforcement (North, 1991: 24). 
In neoclassical theory transactions are disregarded as zero-costs. In contrast Coase 
(1992: 718) argues that exchange is comprised of positive transaction costs: “It 
makes little sense for economists to discuss the process of exchange without 
specifying the institutional setting within which the trading takes place, since this 
affects the incentives to produce and the costs of transacting”. Institutions thereby 
determine total costs – i.e. the combination of transaction and transformation 
(production) costs. If institutional arrangements influence total costs and the rise 
of firms, how do we in turn define institutions?  
     North (2005a) argues that economic change should be analyzed as historic 
processes that originate from the human effort to control and manage uncertainty. 
Throughout history humans have established institutions to enable or improve 
predictability in human interaction. Such institutional frameworks form political 
structures that direct and aggregate political choices, build property rights 
structures that outline formal economic incentives, and form social structures – 
i.e. norms and conventions – that create the informal incentives in the economy 
(North, 2005a: 49). NIE also finds its roots in Common’s institutional theory. 
Commons conceptualized transactions as transfers of legal ownership that are 
determined by the working rules of society – i.e. institutions (Kaufman, 2007: 24). 
According to Commons all organizations are subject to explicit and implicit 
working rules that direct their behaviour and performance (Kaufman, 2007: 15). 
North (2005b: 22) applies a similar definition: “Institutions are the rules of the 
game – both formal rules, informal norms and their enforcement characteristics”. 
The division between formal regulations and informal norms is not absolute. 
Formal and informal constraints are rather opposite ends on the same continuum 
(North, 1993: 78). Formal constraints are explicit and arise from political 
processes and mutual agreements between stakeholders – e.g. constitutions, laws, 
and property rights. These constraints are thus tied to political and judicial rules, 
economic rules, and contracts (North, 1993: 79). Informal constraints are rather 
determined by culturally constructed conventions, codes of conduct, and norms of 
behaviour (North, 1993: 64-65). The cultural influence of the past does not always 
provide the most efficient practises to encounter new uncertainties. The past and 
how it impacts the present and the future thereby is decided by the cultural system 
of a society – so called “path dependence” (North, 1994: 364). Although formal 
rules can change rapidly – e.g. after a revolution – informal norms and belief 
systems change gradually (North, 2005a: 51). Disparities can therefore occur if 
tensions materialize between the implementation of new formal frameworks and 
durable informal societal norms or structures. During the 1990s Coase for 
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example raised critique against the indifference towards institutional arrangements 
by leading policy-makers that enforced or promoted deregulation programs in 
order to rapidly transform the former European communist countries into market 
economies (Hedlund, 2007: 29-30). 
     While institutions constitute the rules of the game organizations are the game 
players. North (1993: 18) differentiates between economic organizations, e.g. 
companies and trade unions, political organizations, e.g. political parties and 
regulatory bodies, and educational organizations, e.g. schools and universities. As 
reality is comprised of uncertainty and scarcities the implementation and 
enforcement of agreements, as mentioned above, is costly, asymmetrical, and 
imperfect (North, 1993: 51). Organizations are thereby constructed instrumentally 
for goal fulfilment. The institutional framework dynamically influences the rise 
and decline of organizations. Simultaneously organizations deliberately try to 
improve their position by altering established institutional arrangements in their 
favour (North, 2005b: 21-22). This dynamic interplay and the ideological beliefs 
of influential political and economic actors change policies over time and 
construct, North (2005b: 25) further notes, the formal rules and informal norms 
that determine economic and political performance. Established institutional 
frameworks hence also constitute constraints towards actors that are seeking to 
change or modify institutions in their favour. Path dependence and the dynamic 
and complex interplay of actors that seek to alter institutional arrangements decide 
economic performance and change. While institutions emerge or are established to 
reduce insecurity and to structure interaction any achieved or adapted stability 
hence does not guarantee efficiency (North, 1993: 20). If the institutional 
framework rewards productive endeavours then organizations will emerge in 
order to engage in productive activities, but if for example piracy is rewarded, 
North (1994: 361) underscores, then piratical organizations will rise. 
 
2.2 Differentiating Public & Private Goods 
 
Markets operate efficiently under perfect competition conditions. Such conditions 
include open market entry and exit, and a sufficiently high number of firms and 
consumers that can equally influence the price setting (Stiglitz, 2000: 77). Under 
such conditions efficiency is achieved when the increased utility of one individual 
does not reduce the utility of any other individual – so called “pareto efficiency” 
(Stiglitz, 2000: 57). This perspective however is concerned with individual 
welfare and thus demands a decentralized system by which the myriad of firms 
and individuals aggregate which and how goods should be produced (Stiglitz, 
2000: 60). In reality, as introduced above, market transactions are costly, demand 
property rights structures, and contract enforcement in order to function. Some 
industries moreover are only comprised of a few firms, and some markets are 
dominated by firms with large market shares. Markets can thus fail to sufficiently 
provide goods, or even completely fail to provide some goods. Market failures 
have ensured a role for the public sector to provide certain goods – e.g. national 
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defense, education, police, and fire protection. So called public goods are 
characterized by non-rivalled consumption and non-excludability traits (Rosen & 
Gayer, 2008: 47). Non-rivalled consumption does not detract from another 
person’s consumption, and non-excludability does not reject anyone from 
consuming a good. If a private good is not compensated the consumer will thus be 
excluded, and when a private good is consumed the consumption of another 
person is detracted. Some goods, such as national defense and light houses, are 
classified as “pure public goods” because they do not cause any rivalry and 
excludability is impossible (Stiglitz, 2000: 128). Separating public from private 
goods, however, is not a definitive matter. It can for example be argued that 
national defense is not a pure public good if armies are engaged in one part of a 
country while the protection of communities in other locations is detracted. Public 
goods that are rivalled and/or excludable to some extent are rather referred to as 
impure public goods (Stiglitz, 2000: 132). 
     When the public sector asks for compensation for medical services or housing 
provision the public sector is as well a provider of private goods. In turn public 
goods can be provided by private initiatives. Central Park in New York City is a 
public space, but the landscaping is funded by private donations (Rosen & Gayer, 
2008: 54). The rivalry and excludability distinctions hence do not necessarily 
reveal if a certain good is or should be provided publically or privately. In reality 
the differentiation of public and private goods varies historically as policy-
making, market conditions, and technologies change. Privatization refers to the 
transfer of provision and/or production of goods to the private sector (Rosen & 
Gayer, 2008: 63). In our time privatization trends, Rosen and Gayer (2008: 63) 
note, have increased worldwide. In for example Denmark two-thirds of the fire 
protection services are provided by a private firm, and in the USA about three 
times more police are hired privately than publically (Rosen & Gayer, 2008: 62). 
Public provision moreover does not reveal if a good is produced by the private or 
the public sector. It is not uncommon for local governments to hire private firms 
in order to provide for example public transportation and fire protection (Rosen & 
Gayer, 2008: 54). 
 
2.3 Defining Private Military Companies 
 
The companies in the private military industry are legally registered, 
hierarchically organized, and competitive corporations that provide services in the 
global marketplace. Singer (2003: 45) underscores that the firms in this industry 
“target market niches by offering packaged services covering a wide variety of 
military skill sets. The very fact that a coherent industry made up of these 
companies is identifiable provides evidence of their distinction”. While the private 
military industry is identifiable the diverse private organizations that operate in 
this industry are difficult to distinguish. Often terms such as private military 
company (PMC), private military firm (PMF), and private security company 
(PSC) are applied interchangeably and arbitrarily. According to researcher Carlos 
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Ortiz (2007a: 61) the companies in this industry can be differentiated as stand-
alone firms that supply private military services independently, and as 
representative entities that are part of hybrid business organizations. Stand-alone 
firms are independent military service providers, but they can also be a subsidiary 
of a different firm. Hybrid business types are however divisions within a 
corporation. Although a company division may provide private military services 
its main business thus falls outside the military branch – such corporations are 
found in for example aerospace, engineering, and information technology sectors 
(Ortiz, 2007a: 62). In this study the standalone private military and armed security 
firm is hereafter referred to as a “private military company” (PMC). As defined by 
Ortiz (2007a: 60) PMCs are: “legally established multinational commercial 
enterprises offering services that involve the potential to exercise force in a 
systematic way and by military means and/or the transfer or enhancement of that 
potential to clients”. 
     Ortiz (2007a) positions the variable PMCs on a service spectrum continuum. In 
one end of the service spectrum companies provide highly specialized services. 
For example “Medical Support Solutions” provides field medicine services in 
conflict areas, and “Global Development Four” provides worldwide transport fleet 
management services (Ortiz, 2007a: 57). On the opposite end of the service 
spectrum, which is the primary concern in this study, companies are engaged in 
operations that are traditionally undertaken by the state military. Some companies 
in this end of the spectrum are negatively labelled as “private armies” or “new 
mercenaries” (Ortiz, 2007a: 56). Such PMCs have the capacity to deploy an 
armed force in order to end a rebellion, or to restore a government to power. 
These services were for example provided by “Sandline International” in Papua 
New Guinea, and by “Executive Outcomes” in Angola. Such PMCs are examples 
of “private combat companies” that operate on the sharp end of the security 
industry (Kinsey, 2006: 13). On this end of the spectrum non-combat companies, 
such as “Military Professional Resources Incorporated” (MPRI), are also 
positioned. MPRI provides the same services that the US military would supply, 
but at a supposedly lower cost and with a limited political risk for the government 
(Kinsey, 2006: 15). MPRI is a global provider of military consulting and training 
services. MPRI for example was hired to upgrade the military and security sectors 
in several Southeast European countries. Some of these PMCs work closely with 
their home governments, and are thus referred to as “proxy military companies” 
(Kinsey, 2006: 15). Among the non-combat PMCs another category of firms can 
be positioned. Firms such as “Kellogg, Brown and Root” provide wide-ranging 
supportive and logistic services for the deployment and maintenance of state 
forces and military facilities (Ortiz, 2007a: 56-57). Security PMCs are also found 
on this sharp end of the spectrum. For example UK-firm “Aegis Defence 
Services” was contracted to provide country-wide security operations in Iraq. Due 
to the negative media attention and mercenary associations many PMCs, however, 
choose to label themselves as security firms – although they are heavily armed 
and/or operate in military environments and war zones (Singer, 2003: 73). 
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3 METHOD 
 
This chapter introduces the methodology of this study: the research design, 
material selection and critique, and the analytical framework. 
 
3.1 Research Design 
 
A qualitative theory-driven literature study design is applied in this study. In 
theory-driven literature studies previous research is analyzed through a specific 
theoretical perspective (Appelquist, 2001: 4). Qualitative approaches are 
moreover advantageous when the research ambition entails exploring broad topics 
and aims to provide an overall account (Holme & Solvang, 1997: 79). Institutions 
and transaction costs are multidimensional phenomena and as well socio-
historically determined. Transaction costs include a wide range of costs that 
depend on many variables. It is therefore inherently complicated to precisely 
quantify such costs. Causality links between transaction costs and institutions 
hence are difficult to establish (Appelquist, 2001: 5). In order to provide an 
interpretative, explorative and explanatory account about the rise of corporate 
military service provision a qualitative research design therefore was selected as a 
favored research approach. 
     A qualitative research approach was also selected in this study as the access to 
reliable statistical data is very restrictive within the private military industry. 
Uncertain and unavailable data within this industry for example obstructs reliable 
annual market revenue estimates (Perlo-Freeman & Sköns, 2008: 8). Neither 
PMCs nor public organizations that employ such private firm practice 
transparency, and despite the recent intensive media focus the knowledge about 
the so called “market for force” is limited (Kinsey, 2006: 1-2). 
  
3.2 Material Selection & Critique 
 
This study primarily relies on secondary source materials. Publications were 
obtained from three main electronic catalogue search engines: ELIN – the Lund 
university catalogue of research journals; LOVISA – the Lund university library 
catalogue, and LIBRIS – the Swedish national academic library catalogue. During 
the article searches general search word combinations were initially applied – e.g. 
“private military” and “Iraq”. Abstracts and full text versions of relevant articles 
were then selected and read, and thereafter new search sessions followed. More 
specific search key word combinations were then applied – e.g. “privatization”, 
“public good”, “private military”. Search sessions were repeated until a sufficient 
number of research publications were obtained. Books that were not available at 
the Lund University libraries were borrowed from other university libraries 
through the university distance-lending system. This study also relies on public 
and official documents and reports. Additionally, newspaper articles and online 
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radio- and TV-programs are utilized in this study as complementary or 
background sources. 
      The existing research about the private military industry is interdisciplinary. 
Robert Kinsey (2006: 1) moreover notes: “While there are some excellent books 
written by academics on the subject, they are few and far between”. The works of 
leading researchers that have produced numerous publications in this field thereby 
are the main secondary material sources in this study – foremost Peter Singer, 
Deborah Avant, Robert Kinsey, and Carlos Ortiz. Peter Singer (2003) provides a 
well-researched historical exposé of private military service provision. In order to 
avoid dependence on one main historical account several other relevant historical 
publications were as well consulted – e.g. by Jan Glete, Michael Howard, and 
Janice Thomson. 
     The application of economic theory in research about the private military 
industry is moreover limited. Most publications in this field originated from 
scholars and authors with limited or no background in economics (Drutshmann, 
2007: 444). As the ambition in this study is to explore the rise of corporate 
military service provision as a phenomenon of economic change the new 
institutional economic theory perspective of economic historian Douglass C. 
North, as outlined in the previous chapter, therefore constitutes the explorative 
and analytical research frame in this study. 
   
3.3 Analytical Framework 
 
The expanding delegation of military and security service provision functions and 
tasks to private military companies constitutes an intensification of contractual 
public-private sector relationships. Under contractual arrangements the principle 
delegates authority and entrusts a hired agent to provide or produce the requested 
services, goods or information. This study is foremost concerned with state 
governments – as contractual principles – and firms – as contractual agents. The 
incentives, choices and objectives of the parties in contractual relationships are 
shaped by the “rules of the game”. How markets in turn develop rests upon 
institutions (Grief, 2005: 727). Institutions are conditioned by their past, they 
provide the structure for exchange and determine the cost of transacting and 
transformation. In accordance with Douglass C. North’s new institutional 
economic theory the findings in this study are therefore analyzed through the 
scope of institutions as formal rules, informal norms, and their enforcement 
characteristics. All societies in history have established variable formal and 
informal constraints in order to structure interaction and to alleviate decision-
making (Hedlund, 2007: 147). The effort to restrict violence within collective 
structures by means of laws, rules, and norms constitutes a recurring struggle in 
human history (Avant (2005: 3). This study thus addresses how the contextual 
interplay of formal rules, informal norms, and their enforcement characteristics 
periodically developed, shaped and constrained military and security service 
provision.   
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4 THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE MILITARY SERVICE PROVISION 
 
The rise of the state and its objectives to control internal matters and coercion to 
enforce rules and compete with other states was, North (1981: 94) argues, the 
most fundamental development in the ancient world. In order to control violence 
and maintain or expand territories state rulers often turned to the market to 
mobilize forces. During the battle of Kadesh (1294 BCE), which is the oldest 
great battle with detailed historical account, the Egyptians fought the Hittites with 
a hired force of Numidians (Singer, 2003: 20). The ancient Greek states upheld 
citizen-armies, but over time, particularly with the onset of the Peloponnesian 
Wars, they also depended on hired forces (Sage, 1996: 148). Eastern monarchies, 
such as Persia, as well readily relied on hired professional troops. When the 
methods of warfare changed Greek rulers increasingly hired specialized troops – 
e.g. archers, slingers, cavalry – as this option was considered more cost-efficient 
than raising equivalent citizen-based troops (Sage, 1996: 156). Frequent political 
turmoil and the rocky soil in Greece ensured vast supplies of professional soldiers 
for hire (Lendon, 2005: 111). Due to the demand for professional military service 
provision specific marketplaces for such services emerged – e.g. at Cape Matapan 
in Southern Lakonia. Alexander the Great in 336 BCE ended the conquering of 
Persia with a predominantly hired force of soldiers (Singer, 2003: 21). The 
imperial citizen-army was the central force of Rome, but as most other states 
Rome also depended on hired specialized units – such as archery and cavalry. 
Carthage, the adversary of Rome during the Punic Wars, by comparison almost 
entirely relied on hired forces due to its small citizen-body (Rich, 2001: 64). As 
the Roman Empire expanded it was increasingly difficult to recruit native Romans 
to command conquered lands. Often armed units were thereby hired from the most 
economically backward regions of the ancient world to overcome this constraint 
(Singer, 2003: 21). By 50 BCE Caesar’s cavalry was virtually a hired force. While 
West Rome deteriorated East Rome (“Byzantium”) maintained its Roman 
institutional heritage. During the middle and late Byzantine periods the imperial 
army was increasingly comprised of “Tagmata” troops, which were elite regiment 
troops that served on a full-time salary basis rather than for duty (Haldon, 1999: 
92). The Muslim enemies of Byzantium also employed professional military 
forces – such as the famous Mamalukes (Singer, 2003: 22).  
     While the Byzantine Empire prospered its Western and Northern neighbours 
regressed into the “Dark Ages”. During the war-torn Middle Ages profit-driven 
and autonomous military companies flourished. In the early modern period the 
private provision of force became a transnational capitalist industry, and beyond 
Europe powerful mercantile trading companies engaged in warfare to conquer 
lands and resources for profit. These developments are the historical focal 
concerns in this study as they signify historical eras when military force and 
security were provided under contractual institutions. Contractual military and 
security arrangements expanded and peaked until the modern state rose to 
gradually monopolize violence and enforce its centralized order. 
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4.1 Medieval & Early Modern Private Military Service Provision 
 
Rome was a unitary state with a strong civic-ethos, disciplined armies, and vast 
man-power resources (Rich, 2001: 64). In Rome the centralized administration, 
imperial army, exceptional road networks, and efficient postal services enabled 
the management of security as a public good (Volckart, 2000: 5). Roman imperial 
institutions – such as Roman law and legal concepts – that enabled stability, 
protection, justice, and property rights lived on in Byzantium (Laiou & Morrison, 
2007: 17-18). Until at least the 12th century Byzantium was a powerful and 
centralized state, and prospered as the most advanced economy in Europe. 
Byzantium maintained exclusive taxation rights, and revenues were redistributed 
through salaries for military and civil officials, defense and military campaigns, 
and public and infrastructural works (Laiou & Morrison, 2007: 18). 
Corresponding institutions did not emerge in medieval Western Europe. The 
dissolution of West Rome caused chronic insecurity, and over time – despite brief 
order under Charlemagne – a feudal system with layered obligations and small 
scale introvert societies developed (North, 1981: 124-126). The political order in 
feudal Europe innately became fragmented, and decentralized political units 
developed. Feudal rulers were not able to organize disciplined armies in order to 
conduct tactical and strategic military campaigns (Honig, 2001: 113). Overseeing 
and protecting decentralized territories caused high transaction costs, whereby 
feudal rulers could not rapidly respond to dangers nor uniformly control their 
territories (Volckart, 2000: 5). 
 
4.1.1 Contracting Free Companies 
 
In feudal Europe security was primarily tied to land ownership. In this system 
lords entered agreements with monarchs as vassals in exchange for military 
protection and mutual security (North, 1981: 127). Local lords were thus tied to 
overlords up to the highest lord in a system of hierarchical obligations. In this 
institutional system security was maintained through the local castle and knights. 
The foundation of this (defense) structure depended on the ability of local lords to 
provide sufficient military capability in the form of costly armoured and mounted 
knights. The knights were only duty-bound during limited time periods – regularly 
forty days of the year – and they were moreover not obligated to serve abroad 
(Thomson, 1996: 27). Despite the hierarchical characteristics of feudal institutions 
hired forces were employed to overcome medieval security constraints. Profit-
driven military organizations emerged to provide military services to the highest 
bidder, and they specialized in providing weapon skills that were considered 
unsuitable for nobles and too advanced for peasants – e.g. the crossbow (Singer, 
2003: 22). The ability of feudal rulers to pay for private military services in the 
end shaped the course of military engagements. 
     When wars ended the hired soldiers, or “free lances”, became unemployed. 
Over time professional soldiers learned to form free lance military organizations 
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in order to facilitate their employment as a group. These organizations were 
known as “free companies”. The term “company” was originally derived from the 
words “con pane” that denote the bread that the free company members shared 
(Singer, 2003: 24). The company members travelled together for mutual 
protection, to find new campaigns, and to blackmail and exploit towns and 
villages. The free companies moreover were not homogenous organizations. 
Company employees were of noble as well as of base-born decent (Howard, 2001: 
18). Over time the companies became durable military and economic 
organizations. The companies sold military services and maintained contract 
based long-term income by supplying protection services in several localities. The 
free companies even conducted marketing and “brand management” by spreading 
rumours about their fierceness in order to create awareness among potential 
employers and to discourage competing companies (Singer, 2003: 24). 
     The feudal economies were agrarian based, and the importance of the cities 
regressed during the Dark Ages. Feudalism dominated many parts of Europe, but 
in the 13th century there was a revival of the urban-based commercial economy in 
Italy. The banking sector grew, and many Italian towns were even turned over to 
private investors for management (Singer, 2003: 22). The Italian city-states 
possessed vast wealth in tradable capital, and thereby they could afford to 
frequently employ free companies. Initially some city-states – such as Florence 
where Machiavelli was active – raised civil forces. The civil forces however 
regularly lost in battle against the more efficient free companies, and eventually 
these city-states as well started hiring free companies to remain competitive 
(Singer, 2003: 23). Wealth, contractual practises, and recurring small wars 
situated Italy as the primary market for force. The companies were employed by 
“condotta” (contract), and a hired soldier was thus called a “condottieri” (Shearer, 
1998: 14). There was a high demand for foreign companies during pre-
Renascence Italy as foreign companies were not perceived as potential rivals by 
the city-state rulers. By employing military companies the city-state moreover 
could avoid enlisting its citizens for war, which otherwise would constrain the 
productive economy. The Milanese dukes, Venetian doges, the Queen of Naples, 
Florentine financiers, and the Pope all hired foreign military companies (Zarate, 
1998: 83). The multinational 10 000 men strong “Great Company” dominated the 
“protection racket” in Italy, and other notable companies such as the “English 
White Company” and the “Grand Catalan Company” were also readily active in 
Italy (Howard, 2001: 25). 
     The free companies in Italy, as elsewhere, proved difficult to control as they 
only served the highest bidder (Mallett, 2003: 71). The Catalan Company later 
relocated to Greece, and in 1311 the company turned against its employer – the 
Duke of Athens. This company ruled Athens for the next sixty-three years 
(Thomson, 1996: 27). During the Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453) the French 
monarchy lost control over the companies. The companies were not only 
dangerous to the enemy, but they were also perilous to their employer as they 
ravaged the countryside during periods of unemployment (North, 1981: 137). The 
pillaging only detracted when the companies were re-recruited for warfare under 
regular pay (Howard, 2001: 18). During peacetime the companies thus were a 
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severe social and economic burden, and the French king eventually attempted to 
eliminate the companies. The free companies however united as one army, and 
managed to defeat the royal army at the battle of Brignais in 1362 (Singer, 2003: 
25). The companies had no political agenda, and so their army soon disintegrated. 
In order to provide employment for the free companies the French king eventually 
went as far as to wage war against Spain and Hungary for this very purpose 
(Howard, 2001: 18). In the Italian city-states various sophisticated institutional 
arrangements emerged to prevent the free companies from gaining control. 
Contracts were for example spread among several competing company captains, 
and some loyal and successful company leaders became integrated into the local 
aristocracies (Singer, 2003: 22-23). By the end of the 14th century privately 
organized units dominated the battlefields on the European continent. Another 
modern business term, “commissioning”, emerged during this time as private 
actors were commissioned to raise armies in exchange for potential returns from 
goods obtained in warfare. The military campaigns in Aquitaine, Brittany, and 
Normandy constituted, Singer (2003: 23) notes, some of history’s first “joint stock 
enterprises” as private investments were risked for future shares from these 
campaigns. 
 
4.1.2 Exporting Pike Square Units 
 
Another type of profit-driven military organizations, in contrast, developed from 
the battle for political freedom. In 1291 the Swiss forest areas and towns united to 
resist foreign forces, and eventually form the Swiss confederation (Howard, 2001: 
27). This confederation successfully defended itself with pikemen citizen-militias. 
At the battle of Sempach in 1386 a force of 1600 Swiss pikemen managed to 
defeat the 6000 men strong invading Austrian army (Singer, 2003: 26). Eventually 
the Swiss militias innovatively transformed the Macedonian phalanx military 
formation into the famous Swiss pike square formation. This pike square 
formation could be applied defensively as a huge and invulnerable hedgehog, but 
it was the charging thousand men Swiss pike square phalanxes that annihilated 
any opposition in their path and altered the nature of warfare on the European 
continent (Howard, 2001: 15). The Swiss and their methods of warfare ended the 
dominance of the mounted knight (Kinsey, 2006: 35). Due to the sparseness of 
their economy the Swiss exported their military skills to rulers on the European 
continent (Howard, 2001: 27).The Swiss became, as Howard (2001: 27) further 
notes, the most sought-after providers of hired military force. Eventually other 
impoverished peoples in the region, such as in South Germany and Austria, 
started copying the Swiss methods and rose pike square units for hire. The Swiss 
dominated this market, but over time they faced competition from foremost the 
South German “Landsknechte” (Howard, 2001: 15). By the end of the fifteenth 
century the hired pike square unit was an indispensable part of warfare.  
      Much like the free companies the Swiss pike square units travelled as cohesive 
armed organizations, and they went to Italy to sell their services to the highest 
bidders. To this day the Vatican is protected by its “Swiss Guard” (Shearer, 1998: 
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14). Pope Julius II employed the Swiss Guard in 1502 to augment the Vatican 
forces (Singer, 2003: 27). The Swiss however primarily provided military services 
to France. The infantry units of France were predominantly hired Swiss forces, 
and the bodyguard units of French monarchs were as well Swiss. The Swiss 
remained a central part of the French forces, Singer (2003: 27) notes, until the end 
of the Napoleonic wars. The Swiss units however were not as autonomous as the 
free companies. The Swiss canton authorities negotiated their contracts, and 
decided which units would be exported (Howard, 2001: 27). The cantons tried 
introducing rules for this export business, but often they had to settle with 
guarantees that that Swiss units never had to fight each other (Singer, 2003: 27). 
Additionally the Swiss were highly specialized. They provided great pike 
phalanxes with troops armed with swords and pole-arms for close combat, but 
they did not diversify their methods as warfare technology evolved (Howard, 
2001: 27-28). The Landsknechte in contrast were autonomous, business oriented, 
maintained a flexible organization, and their recruitment was socially and 
geographically broader (Howard, 2001: 15). Unlike the Swiss the Landsknechte 
also did not hesitate to diversify and adapt as military technology changed – such 
as when firearms became crucial in warfare (Howard, 2001: 28).  
       
4.1.3 The Peak & Decline of Private Military Service Provision  
 
By the end of the sixteenth century the provision of private military services had 
become a classless and multinational trade, and the leading capitalist industry in 
Europe (Howard, 2001: 29). Advanced institutional arrangements that enabled 
stability, protection, justice, and property rights in Rome and Byzantium had not 
yet developed. The lack of competence needed to run complex hierarchical 
organizations for extracting resources by taxation and custom duties, and 
managing public armed forces still constrained early modern rulers to rely on 
market solutions (Glete, 2002: 55). By this time the market in fact provided entire 
armies and navies. Entrepreneurs such as Louis de Geer provided Sweden with a 
complete navy with officers, and Bernard von Sachsen-Weimar raised armies for 
both Sweden and France (Singer, 2003: 28). The leading military entrepreneur 
however was Albrecht von Wallenstein. The military business made him the 
wealthiest person in Europe (Howard, 2001: 29). Wallenstein converted his 
personal wealth into a vast complex of armouries and factories, managed what 
was considered the largest and most efficient enterprise in Europe, conquered 
areas corresponding to current-day Germany and the Czech Republic, held a two-
thousand acre territory as the base for his army, and was a most significant force 
and central actor during the Thirty Years’ War (Singer, 2003: 28-29; Thomson, 
1996: 27-28). During the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) military forces 
predominantly were hired armies, and most battles were fought with multinational 
units. For example a Bavarian regiment was comprised of soldiers from sixteen 
different nationalities – e.g. Spanish, Czech, Greek, Scottish, Turkish, 
Burgundian, Dalmatian (Hartmann, 2001a: 177). The early Swedish campaigns in 
the Thirty Years’ War were primarily conducted with soldiers from Sweden and 
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Finland, but over time this army as well became a multinational hired force. By 
1632 only one-fifth of the Swedish army consisted of soldiers from Sweden and 
Finland (Hartmann, 2001a: 176). In this contractual institutional system soldiers 
were loyal to their commanders rather than the ruling monarchs. Military 
entrepreneurs that as well operated as commanders, such as Wallenstein and von 
Sachsen-Weimar, thereby held significant power and were often demanding more 
than financial returns from warfare (Hartmann, 2001a: 178). The great military 
entrepreneurs however never managed to transform their military power into 
durable political power. Wallenstein almost established a sovereign state, but due 
to continuous warfare and indecisive outcomes the great military entrepreneurs 
could not establish themselves as permanent political actors (Howard, 2001: 30). 
      The end of the Thirty Years’ War paradoxically reversed the influence of the 
private military industry. This war caused great devastation in Europe and reduced 
the dominance of the Hapsburg Empire. The war ended with the “Peace of 
Westphalia” treaties (1648). This peace solidified the sovereignty of the state and 
opened the route for a modern state system in Europe (Hartmann, 2001a: 179). 
Over time hired armies were replaced by citizen-based mass armies, and the 
authority of the state increased dramatically. Feudal ties were disentangled, the 
autonomy of powerful local elites was reduced, and territorial boundaries became 
fixed between states (Hartmann, 2001b: 158). In late medieval Europe contractual 
institutions had provided procedures for rulers to hire armies and navies from 
entrepreneurs, but by the 18th century this market system was virtually replaced by 
hierarchical institutions that enabled states to maintain permanent armies and 
navies (Glete, 2002: 56). Raising and maintaining public armies demanded large 
bureaucracies, nationalism, and vast resources (Kinsey, 2006: 43). Increased and 
more efficient taxation and customs duty enforcement thereby made it possible, 
Glete (2002: 14) notes, to channel resources from society into new organizational 
structures to control violence. Advances in military technology, such as the 
emergence of more accurate firearms, also altered military strategy and the scale 
of war (Kinsey, 2006: 36). Gunpowder-based weapons became the dominant 
military technology on both land and at sea (Glete, 2002: 14). The convergence of 
bureaucratization, politicalization, and industrialization thus enabled the modern 
centralized state to efficiently utilize and mobilize entire societies under a 
hierarchical organization and the new scale of war (Kinsey, 2006: 42).  
 
4.2 Mercantile Companies as Profit-Driven Military Organizations 
 
The feudal system was a defense structure under a decentralized political order. 
The rise of centralized states in contrast established an expansive system. 
Mercantile ideology incited European rulers to achieve national prosperity by 
means of positive trade balances and the acquirement of colonies (Pearson, 1991: 
92). Trade and the plundering of enemies enabled monarchs to build the 
administrative apparatus of their states and to finance national military forces 
(Ravenhill, 2008: 7). At sea states however continued the hiring of “privateers”, 
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which was the practise of authorizing private vessels to attack enemy commerce 
during warfare (Thomson, 1996: 22-23). Until the end of the 18th century this 
practise was a central feature in warfare, and both a foundation and a substitute for 
the naval power of states (Thomson, 1996: 26).  
     The trading companies however became the global instruments of the 
mercantile ideology. They dominated the international trade system, and 
international relations to a great extent were shaped by these companies. 
Travelling to the Indies was a high risk endeavour. These voyages could take 
many years to complete. In order to spread risks the trading companies were 
formed as joint-stock companies (Ortiz, 2007b: 11). Trading companies were also 
charted ventures. They obtained consent in the form of “charters”, which 
legitimated companies to exercise force and conquer lands of commercial and 
military value (Kramer, 2007: 23). The autonomy of the trading companies 
however varied. The Dutch companies were virtually private organizations, the 
French and Portuguese companies were in essence state enterprises, and while 
some English companies were under state control others were autonomous 
(Thomson, 1996: 33). In order to conduct trade and conquer foreign lands the 
trading companies developed sophisticated methods of warfare that enabled them 
to operate and enforce their will on land and at sea (Ortiz, 2007b: 11). The English 
East India Company and the Dutch East India Company are the most evident 
examples of mercantile companies with profound military capabilities.  
      The English East India Company was established in 1599, and in the 
following years the English Crown granted the company full sovereign powers 
(Kramer, 2007: 25). The English company became a competitive instrument for 
the English Crown in regions where the Dutch and Portuguese trading companies 
dominated. By establishing treaties with local rulers the English company 
managed to secure control over the Indian subcontinent (Thomson, 1996: 40-41). 
The company spent a high portion of its revenues to raise armed forces and to 
maintain a powerful military organization. This force was upheld for more than 
150 years. In India the three administrative areas of Bombay, Madras and Bengal 
maintained their own armies, but they were under company control. This force 
was larger than the English army, and the officers were all English and trained at 
the company’s military academy in England (Kramer, 2007: 25). The company 
however did not always side with the Crown’s policies, nor did the company 
always adhere to the demands of the English rulers. During 1612-1615 the 
English company supported the Mogul against the Portuguese, while the English 
king simultaneously was trying to build an alliance with the Portuguese. Another 
example concerns the battles between the French East India Company and the 
English East India Company in Europe during the Seven Years’ War (1754-1763). 
In this war the English Crown’s forces were primarily responsible for defeating 
the French company, but following the exit of the French company the English 
company demanded territories that the English Crown forces had conquered 
(Kramer, 2007: 26). The English company maintained a stronger military force 
than the English Crown, and the government met their demands. 
      The Dutch East India Company was granted a government charter in order to 
primarily engage in trade, but this company as well colonized territories for profit 
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and Dutch geopolitical interests. The Dutch company maintained 150 merchant 
ships, 40 war ships, 50 000 employees, and a 10 000 men strong army (Kramer, 
2007: 27). As a military organization this company fought indigenous peoples, 
and even exterminated whole populations (Kramer, 2007: 26). In Indonesia the 
Dutch company employed Japanese mercenaries to torture and decapitate village 
leaders, the Dutch company conquered Macassar, Sumatra, East Java, and Bantam 
with hired Indonesian forces, and to retake its fort in Calcutta the Dutch Company 
employed 5000 European and 20 000 local troops (Thomson, 1996: 38). The 
Dutch company eventually managed to gain monopoly control over the spice 
trade. These trade routs were also used for textile, gold and silver transports. By 
1669 the Dutch company had become the wealthiest company in history (Kramer, 
2007: 27). Much like the English East India Company the Dutch company also 
defied the interests and demands of its national government. Despite the signing 
of a peace agreement between the Netherlands and Portugal the Dutch company 
engaged in battles with the Portuguese over the South Indian Malabar Coast. 
Another example concerns the conflict over the Indonesian island of Pularoon. 
The Dutch company refused to give up the island despite the fact that this had 
been settled in a treaty between the Dutch and English governments (Kramer, 
2007: 27). 
      The trading companies distorted all basic distinctions: political and 
economical, state and non-state, property rights and sovereignty, public and 
private (Thomson, 1996: 32). The charted trading system served the political, 
territorial and economic interests of states, but this system came with an 
institutional paradox. The mercantile states legitimized non-state violence outside 
their borders, but often they could not enforce charter restrictions. Informally 
some mercantile companies thus operated autonomously, and evolved into 
historically exceptional commercial and military companies. The trading 
companies dragged their states into wars with other states, the companies fought 
each other, and they even engaged in armed battles against their own state 
(Thomson, 1996: 43). On the Western Hemisphere the Dutch West Indies 
Company for example involved the Netherlands in a land war with the 
Portuguese. As the Dutch West Indies Company had made significant profits in 
this war they prevented the enforcement of the peace treaty (Kramer, 2007: 28). 
To optimize the efficiency of the charted non-state organizations formal 
constraints were minimized. At times when regulation was enhanced this only 
reduced the incentives of mercantile companies to engage in trade and warfare 
(Thomson, 1996: 43). This institutional arrangement at the same time provided 
monarchs with the option of “plausible deniability”. When trading companies 
obtained profits and conquered new colonies European rulers claimed their share 
of the progress., When mercantile companies on the other hand caused negative 
outcomes – such as when the companies interfered in the interests of states – the 
same rulers practised deniability and referred to mercantile companies as non-
state actors that were beyond the control of the state (Thomson, 1996: 21).  
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5 THE RISE OF CORPORATE MILITARY SERVICE PROVISION 
 
This chapter explores the resurgence of contractual institutional arrangements and 
the rise of corporate military services provision in our time on three interrelated 
levels: global institutional change and the proliferation of non-state actors; states 
and private military service regulation paths; companies as transnational military 
service providers. 
 
5.1 Global Institutional Change & the Proliferation of Non-State Actors  
 
The end of the Cold War brought about a sudden and profound change in the 
global “rules of the game”. This change altered international relations as well as 
the global security arena. In the wake of this system change new insecurities 
followed. Defense budgets were downsized worldwide, and Cold War political 
alliances changed. Before the end of the Cold War armed conflicts were primarily 
conducted between states, but in the new era armed conflicts were dominantly 
conducted within states (Hoffman & Weiss, 2006: 59-60). After the Cold War 
policy-makers in many countries, moreover, enhanced privatization programs, and 
international organizations, such as the World Bank, furthered market ideological 
policy frameworks around the world (Hedlund, 2007: 33-34). During the post-
Cold War era these formal and informal changes, under the new global 
institutional arrangements, variably incited and enabled the proliferation of 
transnational non-state service providers. 
 
5.1.1 Defense Conversion & the Global Rise of Internal Armed Conflict 
  
The provision of public security and the protection of territorial integrity – i.e. 
sovereignty – solidified the very essence of modern statehood (Held et al, 1999: 
145). While security was established as a public good within modern states 
insecurities only escalated between states. The World Wars and the following 
Cold War marked the 20th century as the most violent century in human history –
the so called “age of global conflict” (Held et al, 1999: 96-97). Two superpowers 
emerged to contest over the post-World War order. This global dynamic 
materialized into two ideological and economic blocks, and globally as well as 
regionally bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation and military alliances 
were established. The superpowers directed vast public resources into the “arms 
race” as a strategy to deter adversaries from ever attacking (Stiglitz, 2000: 335). 
The “hyper-militarized” bipolar world order came to an end when the communist 
block collapsed. The Cold War defense spending had strained national economies, 
and consequently a military downsizing and restructuring trend followed. In for 
example the USA this so called “defense conversion” reduced the number of 
troops, many military bases were closed, and high unemployment followed in 
communities that had relied on generous defense expenditure (Stiglitz, 2000: 341-
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342). Due to the global downsizing of armed forces millions of former soldiers 
became available on the open market. Highly qualified military experts also 
started selling their expertise around the world (Wulf, 2005: 38). In conflict 
regions across the globe former soldiers and special-forces found new 
employment opportunities as private contractors. For example Russian private 
military service providers emerged and were employed to operate alongside 
regular Russian forces in Chechnya, and to defend strategic sites in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia (Singer, 2003: 12). In the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
contractors from Russia and Ukraine were deployed (Wulf, 2005: 42), and 
recently Russian as well as other Eastern European contractors were employed by 
US and UK PMCs in Iraq (PBS, 2005). 
     When the Cold War ended some scholars hastily declared that we had reached 
“the end of history”. It was professed that the global ideological rivalry was 
concluded, the enduring Western form of liberal democracy would thereby be the 
global premise for organizing society, and people would compete peacefully on a 
worldwide market (Nye, 2003:243). This broad enthusiasm about “peace 
dividend” had also incited decision-makers to reduce defence expenditures 
(Stiglitz, 2000: 332). The world however did not prosper or turn peaceful. States 
collapsed, severe economic downturns followed, and the most violent period since 
the Second World War arose. 122 armed conflicts erupted between 1989 and 
2006, and 115 of these conflicts were internal armed conflicts (Harbom and 
Wallensteen 2007: 624). The escalation of armed conflict and civilian deaths 
during the 1990s thus did not primarily originate from warfare between states, but 
from intensified armed conflicts within states. Under the bipolar institutional 
order the superpowers economically and militarily supported regimes across the 
globe along ideological lines, which enabled weak states to contain internal or 
regional instabilities to some extent (Kinsey, 2006: 111). When this support 
system came to an end many weak states in foremost Africa disintegrated further. 
The ability of weak states to control violence was significantly undermined (Wulf, 
2005: 4). Such states also found it increasingly difficult to control their territorial 
integrity as so called “shadow economies” expanded. Shadow economies are 
characterized by interlinked legal and illegal structures that enable the informal 
handling and trade of arms and resources, such as diamonds and oil, through 
transnational networks (Duffield, 2001: 145). While powerful states downsized 
their arsenals after the Cold War the quantity and illegal trade of small arms – 
such as assault weapons and rocket launchers – only increased in the Third World 
(Duffield, 2001: 171-172). During the Cold War states or organized political 
groups had engaged in armed conflicts over political-ideological differences. 
Under the diminishing authority of already weak states the new wars, in contrast, 
were highly localized and interlinked with organized crime, transnational shadow 
economies, and systematic human rights violations (Kaldor, 2000: 9-10). Rebel 
forces, war lords, and criminal organizations systematically targeted civilian 
populations as a strategy to expand or retain influence. In our time 90 percent of 
all casualties in armed conflicts are in fact civilian (Hoffman & Weiss, 2006: 72-
73). During the early 1990s PMCs emerged to offer market solutions to 
governments that were facing such instabilities and difficulties. In for example the 
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Angolan War PMCs employed former U.S. Green Berets, French Foreign 
Legionnaires, South African paratroopers, Ukrainian pilots, and Nepalese Gurkha 
fighters (Singer, 2003: 9). These companies operated the Angolan air force and 
conducted aerial reconnaissance, launched commando raids, protected diamond 
fields, blocked rebel force supply routes, and conducted demining (Singer, 2003: 
9-10). 
 
5.1.2 Non-State Actors, Privatization Ideology & International Frameworks 
 
The proliferation of non-state actors during the post-Cold War era manifested the 
ideological convictions of policy-makers and advocates that distrusted the ability 
of the state to provide cost-efficient or sufficient public services and development 
solutions (Anheimer, 2001: 3; Kinsey, 2006: 96). To enable economic growth 
developing countries were “prescribed” certain economic reforms – such as 
privatization, deregulation, and trade liberalization – by the World Bank, the IMF, 
and the US Treasury Department. This economic reform paradigm is broadly 
referred to as the “Washington Consensus” (Stiglitz, 1999: 4). Privatization 
promotion was for example grounded in the "grabbing hand" theory of 
government. According to this perspective the state causes inefficiencies or 
failures by interfering in state firms and by preying on private firms (Stiglitz, 
1999: 21). Washington Consensus advisers as well prescribed rapid privatization 
programs – so called “shock therapy” – in the former Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. Stiglitz (1999: 1) critically notes: “As rapidly as the countries announced 
the abandonment of communism, so too did western advisers march in with their 
sure-fire recipes for a quick transition to a market economy”. In Western countries 
broad privatization programs, however, were initiated long before the end of the 
Cold War. During the 1980s the privatization programs of US President Ronald 
Reagan and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher for example included to the 
defense industry, military research, and international development policy (Wulf, 
2005: 169). The conviction that the market should provide solutions and ensure 
cost-efficiency in the public space became an international model for public 
management – the so called “New Public Management” (NPM). The NPM 
framework promoted extended contractual institutions by furthering the 
interaction between the public sector and private firms. When many firms 
compete to obtain government contracts, NPM proponents argue, the public sector 
is expected to be able to reduce costs and improve service quality – whether social 
or military services are provided (Ortiz, 2008: 3-4). Under these contractual 
institutions the traditional service provision roles of the public sector became 
interlinked with new contract tendering, management, and supervision 
responsibilities. As traditional public domains were privatized or constrained in 
accordance with the NPM framework(s) privatization policies also came to 
increasingly include the military service domain. While for example Prime 
Minister Thatcher did not specifically support the proliferation of PMCs the 
privatization of military services in our time is, according to Wulf (2005: 169-
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170), an enhancement or continuation of the privatization trends that were 
initiated before the end of the Cold War. 
     The state-centric international doctrines and institutions that were developed 
during the Cold War were reassessed in the wake of escalating internal violence 
and civilian deaths. After the Cold War the international community gradually 
transformed the normative framework for international affairs under the UN 
(Tschirgi, 2003: 2-3). While the UN continued its traditional “Westhphalian” 
responsibilities – i.e. state security and territorial integrity – it also increasingly 
focused on human security from a non-state perspective. The UN therefore 
legitimized humanitarian interventions and launched many international 
peacebuilding missions that in some cases even included the temporary 
administration of states – such as in Cambodia (Paris, 2002: 639; Kinsey, 2006: 
59-60). In the search for balance between state-led and market-led approaches the 
UN, EU, World Bank, and other international organizations as well as bilateral 
donors allocated more responsibilities to non-state actors and dramatically 
increased their funding (Anheimer, 2001: 3-4). In our time international NGOs 
thereby are estimated to disburse more money than the UN (Keane, 2003: 5). 
Non-profit and community organizations were normatively upheld as a middle-
way between market solutions and state-led approaches, and their activities 
increased in volatile regions due to the new global insecurities and vast 
humanitarian needs. Networks that are comprised of UN organizations, the 
military, government agencies, NGOs, and PMCs are now emerging in 
development work (Kinsey, 2006: 128). When the public apparatus is unable to 
provide security in volatile regions, Avant (2005: 148) notes, non-state actors 
such as international organizations, NGOs, and transnational corporations (TNCs) 
have contracted PMCs to conduct logistics, site security, crime prevention, and 
intelligence gathering. The worldwide proliferation of non-state actors 
consequently has increased the demand private force and security services.  For 
example US-firm “ICI Oregon” has both provided security and transportation 
services for the UN “World Food Program” and to corporations in unstable 
regions (Avant, 2005: 149).  
     As the “global rules” of the Cold War “game” changed state militaries were 
not only adapted for conventional warfare in the new era, but they were also 
restructured to respond to the global rise of internal armed conflicts and 
humanitarian crises (Kinsey, 2006: 96). While the UN initiated new international 
frameworks and supported humanitarian interventions to protect civilians, 
powerful states, however, only selectively took on such responsibilities (Shearer, 
1998: 32-33). This is foremost underlined by the failure of the permanent UN 
Security Council member nations to respond to the genocide in Rwanda (Kinsey, 
2006: 60). The USA retained its superpower status after the Cold War, but US-
public support for military interventions fragmented after the 1993 setbacks in 
Somalia. Since the end of the Vietnam War the US-military and the political 
leadership have sought to follow the so called “zero dead” doctrine. According to 
this doctrine military operations need to be resolute and successful, and only cause 
marginal casualties to avoid declining public support (Agrell, 2000: 164). This 
ideal was fulfilled during the Gulf War in 1990. When the TV-media showed a 
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video of the bodies of US-causalities being dragged through the streets of 
Mogadishu by Somalis the US-public support plummeted. In the 1999 Kosovo 
War US-forces were, in contrast, not engaged on the ground until the war had 
ended. During the 1990s the contracting of military support services firm “Brown 
& Root Services” for example reduced US-troop commitments in the former 
Yugoslavia by about 8900 troops (Singer, 2003: 146). As Perlo-Freeman and 
Sköns (2008: 3) note “this practice may carry perceived political advantages 
because the deaths of private contractors may be less politically sensitive than 
those of soldiers”. Casualties among PMC-employees are in fact not included in 
official US death-toll statistics (Singer, 2007: 4). In 2004 the TV-media however 
showed videos of the desecrated bodies of four US-American Blackwater 
contractors that had been lynched, drag through the streets and hung from a bridge 
in Fallujah, Iraq. Blackwater had sent the contractors on a mission without the 
proper equipment, training, or preparation (Singer, 2007: 14). While the US-
military was restructured in the 1990s to engage a higher number of contractors 
the profound increase of non-state actors in US-military operations, however, 
came to blur the distinction between the regular military and private sector 
contractors in the field (NPR, 2005; PBS, 2005). After the lynching of the 
contractors the infamous and bloody Fallujah battle(s) between coalition forces 
and insurgents followed. US-marines and soldiers were killed and 500 were 
wounded, and Fallujah became a rallying point for the wider insurgency (Singer, 
2007: 4, 14). The proliferation of non-state actors under contractual institution, as 
during pre-modern eras, distorted the public-private sphere distinction.  
 
5.2 States & Private Military Service Regulation Paths 
 
Many private military companies are transnational organizations and their 
employees are recruited worldwide. The rise of corporate military service 
provision however is signified by companies that are or were legally registered in 
the USA, South Africa, and the UK (Avant, 2007: 419). The institutional 
arrangements in these countries constitute three contrasting frameworks that 
variably influenced the post-Cold War rise of PMCs. 
 
5.2.1 The Privatization Path in the USA 
 
The US-military has relied on private contractors since the Revolutionary War. 
During the 2003 Iraq war and the reconstruction process the engagement of 
contractors reached its heights. The ratio of US-funded contractor to US-military 
personnel in Iraq was 1 to 1, while during the Second World War the ratio was 1 
to 7, and in the Vietnam War the ratio was 1 to 5 (CBO, 2008: 12-13). During the 
last century the defense industry and the US-military gradually developed a close 
and mutually beneficial working relationship. Companies were foremost awarded 
contracts to provide technical solutions and to manage military assignments 
(Kinsey, 2006: 98). This gradual military privatization was not merely driven by 
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market ideological paradigms. The evolution of sophisticated military technology 
has as well contributed to transform the structure and path of the US-military. 
According to Kinsey (2006: 95-96) the maintenance and handling of advanced 
military technology requires civilian support as such expertise is not taught by the 
military. As military operations and technologies became more sophisticated the 
contracting of PMCs therefore evolved and increasingly became a vital and 
necessary part of the US-military (Avant, 2007: 422). Unlike the regular military 
unit PMCs are not directly part of the military structure, and thereby do not accrue 
costs during peacetime (CBO, 2008: 14). Firms thus are employed under 
contractual arrangements to rapidly provide specific services and skills when their 
engagement is required, and to augment the regular military capacity when 
conflicts emerge (Cancian, 2008: 66). 
     Military privatization hence is far from a recent post-Cold War arrangement. 
For example the “Vinnell Corporation” was founded in 1931 as a construction 
company, but during the Second World War this firm became experienced in 
managing military assignments (Kinsey, 2006: 99). Vinnell eventually evolved 
into a military training PMC with a worldwide customer base. Notably Vinnell 
trains and provides expertise to the “Saudi National Guard”, and employs about 
1400 people in Saudi Arabia – foremost former U.S. Special Forces – under a 
USD 800 million contract that, according to Singer (2003: 13), virtually makes 
this PMC the manager of Saudi Arabia’s national forces. “DynCorp”, another 
prominent US PMC, was formed in 1946 and diversified as a domestic and global 
provider of aviation and marine services, logistical support services, and personal 
and physical security services (Kinsey, 2006: 99). The employment of private 
contractors foremost increased after the Vietnam War as military technology 
became more sophisticated (Avant, 2006: 329). In 1985 the first “Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program” (LOGCAP) was initiated. Under this contractual 
program the US-Army hired corporations to provide logistics and supportive 
services that are vital to the fielding of an army (Cancian, 2008: 66). During the 
Cold War the US Air Force and the US Navy also employed contractors to 
provide specialized services and to maintain complicated equipment under large 
contractual programs (Gansler Commision. 2007: 37). During the 1990 Gulf War 
the operational support for the optically tracked wire-guided missiles, M1A1 
tanks, and the Patriot missiles was provided by private contractors, and in the 
2003 Iraq War private contractors provided operational support for the B-2 stealth 
bomber, the F-117 stealth fighter, the unmanned Global Hawk aerial vehicle, the 
U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, the M-1 tank, the Apache helicopter, and several 
Navy ships (Avant, 2006: 329). Over time PMCs thus have become an integral 
and indispensable part of the US-defense system. US PMCs are however not 
allowed to sell their services to any foreign country or actor. Domestic formal and 
informal frameworks regulate if PMCs can obtain or bid for foreign contracts. 
     Formal regulatory constraints were established over time to halt PMCs from 
contravening US-policy aims. PMCs are therefore obligated to apply for 
government consent before they can accept contracts abroad. Congress is only 
notified on rare occasion when contracts surpass USD 50 million (Avant, 2007: 
426). The “International Transfer of Arms Regulations” dictates US-military 
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service exports to foreign governments, and the “Department of State’s Office of 
Defence Trade Controls” oversees if proposed PMC-service exports contravene 
US-policy interests (Avant, 2007: 425). Contracts are licensed by the US-
government, and other organizations are invited to remark if a license should be 
granted – e.g. the political-military bureau, the desk officer from the country in 
question, and other organizations such as the “Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor” (Avant, 2007: 425). Services that involve lethal training are 
more closely inspected than non-lethal service exports. Countries that are not 
restricted by the “State Department Embargo Chart” are usually allowed to buy 
military services from the US private military sector. For “in-between cases” 
several offices are consulted, and finally the “Assistant Secretary” makes a final 
decision. In reality, Avant (2007: 425) argues, the licensing process rather occurs 
ad hoc. When PMCs apply to renew a license they are sometimes not scrutinized 
as closely even if conditions may have changed. The US “State Department” is 
obligated to monitor the behaviour of countries that employ US PMCs. If 
expectations are not being met the State Department can freeze contracts (Avant, 
2007: 425). Sometimes this oversight is not prioritized. After US-firm “AirScan” 
coordinated air strikes in Columbia – during the so called “War on Drugs” – and 
caused civilian casualties a State Department official stated: “...our job is to 
protect Americans, not investigate Americans” (cited in Singer, 2003: 239). 
  
5.2.2 The Delegitimatization Path in South Africa 
 
The battle for equality and political freedom in South Africa brought down the 
apartheid system almost at the same time as the Cold War came to an end. The 
democratic state building process in South Africa also entailed restructuring the 
military sector. Under the apartheid system South Africa was a militarized society, 
security forces operated with impunity, and vast resources were directed towards 
maintaining this control apparatus (Avant, 2007: 429). While the ANC 
government worked to transform the old security and military system domestic 
PMCs, such as Executive Outcomes, started recruiting military personnel from 
this sector – especially from Special Forces regiments. At the same time the ANC 
ideologically opposed broad privatization programs. The previous apartheid era 
governments had initiated wide privatization programs to restrain the influence of 
the next democratic government by leaving it with a small public sector (Avant, 
2007: 430). After the superpower proxy support ended many African states were 
in need of external support to restore order. The security vacuum on the continent 
incited South African PMCs to target countries with extractive resources as well 
as wealthy commercial clients (Avant, 2005: 159). As South African PMCs 
obtained lucrative contracts in conflict regions on the African continent the ANC 
government – as a moral representative of a new democratic state – regarded 
PMCs as threats to its foreign policy (Avant, 2007: 431). Officials at the same 
time have expressed that the government also perceived the foreign activities of 
PMCs as an opportunity to keep “troublesome” ex-military personnel outside 
South Africa (Avant, 2007: 429). In other interviews officials, however, have also 
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stated that PMCs undermined the new South African military structure by 
draining it of resources and competent personnel. 
     Although South African PMCs employed ex-military personnel from Europe, 
the Americas, Asia and Africa many PMCs also employed personnel that had 
actively worked against the ANC during the apartheid era (Avant, 2005: 158). 
With this inherent distrust the government moved to regulate PMC activities. 
During the early 1990s some interaction between South African PMCs and the 
government did occur, but the relationship between the ANC and PMCs was 
distrustful (Avant, 2007: 431). Officially PMC regulation was motivated as a 
necessary step to regulate the “foreign military assistance” activities of South 
African citizens, and in 1998 the “Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act” 
was passed (Avant, 2005: 161). Executive Outcomes – the world-leading PMC at 
the time – supported the adoption of regulation. EO was granted a license in 1998. 
Many other South African PMCs also supported the adoption of regulation as they 
expected that legal frameworks would give them legitimacy and thereby enhance 
their capacity to further engage on the global market (Avant, 2005: 166). 
Informally this regulation was however perceived as an instrument to put the 
South African PMCs out of business (Avant, 2007: 432). Within one year EO 
closed down. Several South African PMCs however continued providing their 
services by moving their offices abroad, restructured into smaller companies, or 
moved underground (Avant, 2005: 166). While the government increased its 
domestic control over PMCs it lost what little influence and insight it had over 
South African PMC activities abroad. 
     The South African government opposed the 2003 US-led war in Iraq. South 
African citizens still went to Iraq to work as contractors (PBS, 2005). About 4000 
South African citizens are estimated to have found employment as PMC 
contractors in Iraq (IRIN, 2008). In response the South African government 
continued on its delegitimization path by replacing the aforementioned 
“Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act” of 1998 with a new Act: “The 
Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Regulation of Certain Activities in 
Country of Armed Conflict Act” of 2006. According to Len le Roux (2008), from 
the “Institute For Security Studies”, the purpose of the new Act is to “prohibit 
mercenary activity, to regulate the provision of assistance or service of a military 
or military-related nature in a country of armed conflict, to regulate the enlistment 
of South African citizens or permanent residents in other armed forces, and to 
regulate the provision of humanitarian aid in a country of armed conflict”. The 
new regulation also states that South African organizations and individuals are 
required to apply for authorisation with the “National Conventional Arms Control 
Committee” (NCACC) before they can enter a country that is undergoing armed 
conflict (IRIN, 2008). The NCACC authorization process aims to stop individuals 
and organizations from enlisting in foreign armies, and to halt those that intend to 
provide assistance, training, recruitment, financing or any other act that may 
further the military capabilities of parties in armed conflict (IRIN, 2008). Until 
today South Africa is still the only country to have delegitimized PMCs. 
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5.2.3 The Informal Export Facilitator Path in the UK 
 
The UK-government relies on informal relationships with non-state military 
service providers. This allows the government to maintain its official distance 
from such actors, to practise plausible deniability, and to refrain from introducing 
regulation (Avant, 2007: 436). The UK regulatory environment is informal, and 
interactions between the government and PMCs therefore are conducted ad-hoc 
(Avant, 2005: 167). Due to the lack of regulation and formal ties the governmental 
influence over UK PMCs is limited (Kinsey, 2003: 103). Interactions between the 
government and PMCs are also politically sensitive. During the midst of the Cold 
War the informal ties between some politicians and (illegitimate) non-state 
military actors were considerable. According to Kinsey (2006: 43-44) the shared 
experiences of having served in the British Army during the Second World War, 
and similar political beliefs among political elites and individual mercenaries 
facilitated informal networks during the Cold War that were utilized to promote 
UK foreign policy objectives in Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East. Today 
the public as well as military personnel in the UK are suspicious of PMCs: private 
contractors are often referred to as mercenaries, when former military personnel 
decide to sell their expertise this is traditionally frowned upon, and British Army 
personnel usually regard PMCs as an intrusion in their work field (Avant, 2005: 
174). As most UK PMC personnel are former military or government employees 
their activities are, for the most part, unlikely to contravene British interests 
(Shearer, 1998: 36). When for example UK-firm Sandline planned to work with 
the Kosovo-Albanian rebel force (KLA) in 1998 – at the time the KLA was 
classified as a terrorist organization by the USA – the British Foreign Office 
intervened to prevent this engagement (Singer, 2003: 219, 223) 
     The contractual military and security arrangements between the public and 
private military sectors in the USA provide PMCs with lucrative and long-term 
contracts. Similar institutional arrangements do not exist in the UK. While the 
UK-government has recognized the benefits of contracting PMCs for military 
training tasks and security operations the government continues to rely on and 
even increases the engagement of public agencies and public forces where 
required (O'Brien, 2000: 6). Consequently the UK-government is not a frequent 
employer of PMCs. While US PMCs foremost target large and lucrative 
government contracts UK PMCs, by comparison, are smaller and to a greater 
extent depend on the commercial security market (Kinsey, 2006: 103). Although 
UK PMCs strive to obtain contracts from the UK-government and foreign 
governments they depend on contracts from the corporate sector, international 
governmental organizations, and NGOs. In the UK, as in most countries, the 
private military service business is not regulated. Instead military firms and public 
departments interact informally. The “Defence Export Services of Arms 
Organization”, within the UK “Ministry of Defence”, provides advise to firms 
aiming to export their products or services, facilitates interaction between UK-
firms and foreign governments, provides advice in legal, financial, military and 
political issues, and generally supports the UK-industry in other countries (Avant, 
 
29 
36 
 
2007: 438). This informal export facilitator path was initiated during the 1960s 
when the company “WatchGuard International” emerged a provider of military 
and security services to the Persian Gulf states. WatchGuard employed former 
British special forces personnel, and provided military training and military 
support in operations against rebel movements in the Gulf States (O'Brien, 2000: 
3). This PMC expanded globally and eventually provided military advisory 
training services in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and East Asia. Before 
the end of the Cold War other companies such as “KMS”, “Saladin”, and 
“Defense Systems Limited” also emerged, and during the post-Cold War era 
“Northbridge”, “Aims Limited”, “Rubicon International”, and “Sandline 
International” entered the market as new UK PMCs (Avant, 2007: 437). After a 
political scandal involving UK-firm Sandline International in Sierra Leone, which 
is further addressed below, it was officially investigated if so called “military 
service exports” ought to be regulated (Avant, 2007: 439). In 2002 a “Green 
Paper” – i.e. a tentative report of a government proposal not committed to action – 
raised the case for regulation. The need for regulation was recommended in order 
to contain PMCs within formal frameworks, to protect UK interests and the 
reputation of the UK-government, and to avoid risks to British lives (Avant, 2005: 
172). This proposal thus called for regulation to ensure standards and guidelines 
within the military service industry. It was argued that such standards would 
enable the differentiation between reliable and less reliable firms. Despite heated 
debates in parliament the Green Paper recommendations did not lead to any new 
legal frameworks or guidelines. Many UK PMCs supported the regulation 
proposals as they expected that such regulatory frameworks would lead to more 
government support for their industry (Avant, 2005: 173). 
     In September 2008 the UK, however, alongside 16 other nations – including 
the USA, South Africa, and China – signed the so called “Montreux Document” 
(UN, 2008: 3). Although the Montreux Document is not legally binding and does 
not aim to legitimatize PMCs the 17 countries have signed on to follow 70 
recommendations of good practises that relate to the engagement of PMCs – such 
as contracting procedures and track-record verifications of firms, staff vetting, and 
contract monitoring. This document underlines that international law, especially 
international humanitarian law and human rights law, applies to PMCs and that 
such firms therefore do not operate in a legal vacuum (UN, 2008: 3). As such 
PMCs are bound to “comply with international humanitarian law or human rights 
law imposed upon them by applicable national law, as well as other applicable 
national law such as criminal law, tax law, immigration law, labour law, and 
specific regulations on private military or security services” (UN, 2008: 10). 
 
5.3 Companies as Transnational Military Service Providers 
 
Since the 1990s more than one hundred PMCs have operated in more than one 
hundred countries (Holmqvist, 2005: 1). Although the industry is dominated by 
companies from the US, UK and South Africa new firms such as the Russian 
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“Alpha team” and other firms from e.g. France, Canada, Belgium, Israel, and 
Australia have as well entered the market as transnational PMCs (Singer, 2003: 
12). These companies apply standard business practises such as staff vetting and 
draw on financial, legal, marketing, and administrative support as any other 
legitimate business (Kinsey, 2006: 14). PMC personnel are recruited worldwide. 
Backgrounds range from jungle fighters with twenty years of warfare experience 
to administrative staff without any combat experience (Singer, 2003: 76). In the 
latter Iraq war UK PMC “Global Risk Strategies” employed 500 troops from Fiji 
that had served in East Timor or the Middle East, and other companies, such as 
US-firms Blackwater and Triple Canopy, recruited personnel from Chile and El 
Salvador (Avant, 2006: 330). The mobility of PMC personnel enables fluidity in 
the industry as employees with specialized skills can be contracted by smaller 
companies to expand the range of services offered (Kinsey, 2006: 8). To the 
outside world PMC personnel are usually difficult to identify. Although PMCs are 
permanent structures their workforce usually is only large enough to enable the 
management of administrative tasks and contracts. Most ex-service personnel are 
thus subcontracted. US-firm Dyncorp even held a potential employment list of 
Spanish speaking personnel in the event that Dyncorp would be hired to operate in 
a “post-Castro” Cuba (Singer, 2003: 14-15). Although PMCs sometimes are 
referred to as “database militaries” this subcontract model is common in other 
industries where firms seek to reduce work force costs (Kinsey, 2006: 15). Singer 
(2003: 75) notes that PMCs thereby operate similarly to e-commerce companies. 
While this model is cost-efficient and enables a flexible service range, Kinsey 
(2006: 15) underscores, the reliance on subcontracting practices constrains the 
vetting process. 
     To differentiate and illustrate PMCs as transnational actors and link the 
aforementioned post-Cold War global institutional changes and the national 
formal and informal regulation paths the services and impact of combat PMCs in 
Sierra Leone, consulting and support services PMCs in the Former Yugoslavia, 
and security PMCs in Iraq are further introduced in this chapter. These cases also 
reflect three waves of PMC expansion that signify the post-Cold War rise of 
corporate military service provision. 
 
5.3.1 Combat PMCs in Sierra Leone 
 
During the decolonization in the 1960s national liberation movements fought for 
self-determination in Africa. In response mercenaries were hired to retain the 
economic and political interests of colonial enclaves and Western powers (Zarate, 
1998: 79). In 1977 the “Organization for African Unity” (OAU) adopted a 
convention to prohibit mercenary activity. The OAU convention was specifically 
adopted to prohibit the hiring of mercenaries by colonial enclaves (McInstyre & 
Weiss, 2007: 67). As the proxy support from the superpowers ended and internal 
armed conflicts intensified the first broad wave of new PMCs emerged in the early 
1990s to offer their services to governments in Africa. Unlike the illegitimate hire 
of mercenaries during the decolonization period PMCs in contrast offered 
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legitimate contractual solutions to governments. Weak states that are in need of 
military and security services that can be provided by PMCs, however, usually are 
unable to pay for such services in the long-run. 
     During the 1990s Executive Outcomes was the market-leading transnational 
PMC (Fuchs, 2007: 105-106). EO still holds a renowned reputation in the private 
military industry, and embodies the first broad rise of combat PMCs during the 
post-Cold War era. EO was formed in 1989 by South African defence force 
members and secret service member Eeben Barlow (Zarate, 1998: 91). This PMC 
foremost employed former elite army troops and conducted military operations in 
Africa and Asia until it closed down in 1999. In 1995 the Sierra Leone 
government contracted EO to train its defense forces and to drive out the rebel 
forces (RUF) from Freetown and the diamond fields (Fuchs, 2007: 108). Before 
EO emerged Sierra Leone was under total anarchy. The civil war in Sierra Leone 
was one the most brutal in history (Singer, 2003: 3). The rebels massacred 
villages and systematically murdered, raped and tortured civilians. Machete 
mutilations were common. Children were as well used by the rebel forces to carry 
out attacks on civilians. Many underpaid soldiers from the regular military also 
joined the rebels and targeted civilians (Singer, 2003: 3). When EO entered Sierra 
Leone it successfully coordinated operations that destroyed key RUF-bases, the 
RUF was forced to retreat and negotiate, and eventually this enabled the signing 
of a peace agreement. EO’s intervention strengthened the Freetown regime, 
enabled elections, and internal war-torn regions were stabilized to the extent that 
one million refuges could return home (Shearer: 1998: 65). For the first time in 23 
years Sierra Leone could hold free elections (Singer, 2003: 4). Notably Sierra 
Leone had asked for British military support in the early 1990s, but this request 
was turned down by the UK (Kinsey, 2006: 63). After EO’s departure the new 
civilian government was soon overthrown in a military coup, and the security 
conditions in Sierra Leone again deteriorated. The coup was lead by Major Johnny 
Paul Koroma that had formed the “Armed Forces Revolutionary Council” 
(AFRC) by mobilizing revolting fractions within the Sierra Leone army (Fuchs, 
2007: 110). The “Economic Community of West African States” responded by 
directing 11 000 Nigerian troops from its “Cease-Fire Monitoring Group” 
(ECOMOG) to Sierra Leone as a peacekeeping force and to confront Major 
Koroma. The Major however turned to a power-sharing agreement with the RUF 
and remained in power in the capital (Shearer, 1998: 67). The military coup and 
the return of the RUF destabilized Sierra Leone, and undermined the security 
progress that EO had achieved in a short-time period. Following EO’s official 
departure UK-firm Sandline International was eventually contracted to reinstate 
the exiled President Kabbah (Fuchs, 2007: 111). According to Fuchs (2007: 111) 
some EO personnel, however, stayed in Sierra Leone unofficially and continued 
working with Sandline. 
     UK-firm Sandline International was founded in London by Colonel Tim Spicer 
that aimed to “fill a vacuum in the post-Cold War era” (Wulf, 2005: 178). To 
reinstate the exiled president Kabbah this PMC was entrusted with multiple roles. 
Sandline provided training, planned and coordinated operations, provided 
logistical and air support, intelligence services, and was entrusted to unofficially 
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equip Kabbah-supportive forces with tons of arms and ammunition (Avant, 2005: 
93; Fuchs, 2007: 111). It was alleged that the “British High Commissioner” to 
Sierra Leone had introduced Sandline to Kabbah with the consent of the UK 
Security Services and parts of the British government (Fuchs, 2007: 111). The 
involvement of UK-officials in a country under an UN-arms embargo grew to the 
aforementioned political scandal – the so called “Sandline Affair” (Fuchs, 2007: 
111-112). The British Custom’s Agency raised legal proceedings, and raided the 
offices of Sandline International (Singer, 2003: 115). Sandline claimed that the 
British Foreign Ministry was fully informed about its activities in Sierra Leone, 
which was denied officially but later, Singer (2003: 115) notes, shown to be true. 
The controversy aside, in 1998 Sandline International, ECOMOG troops, and pro-
Kabbah forces enabled the return of president Kabbah. This second major combat 
PMC intervention in Sierra Leone was also successful. Soon after the completion 
of this mission Sierra Leone however again descended into violence (Holmqvist, 
2005: 13). Some EO and Sandline personnel stayed in Sierra Leone, according to 
Avant (2005: 95), due to their alleged associations with international mining 
interests and companies. Although Sierra Leone is resource rich it is financially 
poor. For ten years the war in Sierra Leone was primarily waged for the control of 
the diamond fields and other mining interests rather than for the political control 
of the capital (Singer, 2003: 65). The mining industry made up two-thirds of 
Sierra Leone’s exports during the 1990s whereby the government needed to 
secure this industry to ensure national survival and security. Most researchers 
argue that EO was in part compensated through diamond exploration concessions 
(Fuchs, 2007: 108). Former EO executives and personnel, however, have never 
been prosecuted for such illegitimate payments. 
  
5.3.2 Consulting & Support Services PMCs in the Former Yugoslavia 
 
The second broad expansion of PMCs during the early 1990s is signified by the 
rise of non-combat firms that entered the market to profit from the US-defense 
conversion, US-military interventions, and from the need of states to upgrade their 
military and security sectors and capabilities. Commonly these PMCs either 
provide military training and consulting services, or supportive services to 
alleviate the deployment of public forces and to maintain and/or build military 
facilities and manage logistics. The post-Cold War military downsizing and the 
emergence of new states in need of security and military sector upgrading 
constituted a broad worldwide demand. Due to the military privatization path in 
the USA many US-firms entered the market to provide military training and 
consulting, and supportive services. At the same time the global diversity of these 
service markets is signified by firms such as French “Secrets”, Australian 
“Fynwest Party, Ltd.”, British “Aims Limited”, Belgian “International Defence 
and Security”, and Israeli “Levdan” (Avant, 2005: 18-19). 
     Among the non-combat consulting and training PMCs US-firm MPRI is the 
most prominent. This firm was started by former US-Army Major General Vernon 
Lewis as a domestic company that aimed to profit from the US-defense 
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conversion (Singer, 2003: 119-120). The potential to profit on the global market 
however incited MPRI to expand worldwide. In the early 1990s for example 
Sweden hired MPRI to consult its senior military leaders about the lessons of the 
Gulf War (Singer, 2004: 3). MPRI employees are recruited from the top levels of 
retired US-military personnel. This firm does not only offer clients the highest 
levels of military expertise, but their services are as well closely and informally 
tied to US-policy interests (Singer, 2003: 119). MPRI is one of the primary 
consultants and advisors to the US-military (Singer, 2003: 123). Domestically 
MPRI for example conducts military analyses, simulations, and runs training 
exercises. These are all tasks that otherwise are undertaken by the regular military. 
MPRI however primarily proliferated from its international contracting, which 
took off during the deterioration of Yugoslavia. 
     In 1994 the US “State Department” issued a license that allowed MPRI to 
provide its services to the Croatian “Ministry of Defence”. The introduction of 
MPRI altered the war in the region. Officially MPRI was contracted to assist the 
Croatian Army to become a more professional force so it could participate in the 
“Partnership for Peace Program” (Avant, 2005: 102). In 1995 an advanced 
military offensive called “Operation Storm” however was launched by the 
Croatian forces and, according to Singer (2003: 126), the scale and sophistication 
of this attack caught everyone in the region by surprise. In a short time period the 
Croatian army had been transformed from a “rag-tag” militia into a highly 
professional military force. Within a week the Croats had seized the Krajina 
region from the Serbs (Avant, 2005: 103). This was the turning point in the war. 
MPRI was as well contracted to provide classroom instructions about democratic 
principles and civil-military relations to the Croatian officers. This is notable as 
the Croatian offensive, additionally, violated the UN established cease-fire, 
170 000 people became refugees, and led to ethnic cleansing (Singer, 2003: 126; 
Avant, 2005: 106). In 1991 the USA had approved an arms embargo in the UN 
Security Council that as well prohibited the provision of military training and 
consulting by other states (Singer, 2003: 125). To overcome these “constraints” 
MPRI thus served US-policy objectives in the region as a proxy organization, 
whilst the US-government could practise plausible deniability (Singer, 2003: 125, 
133). Before MPRI entered the African, Asian, and South American markets this 
firm was awarded several other contracts in the former Yugoslavia. MPRI secured 
a high-profile contract to transform the Bosnian military, set up a program to 
improve the military and the border patrol of Macedonia, and through its Croatian 
and Bosnian contracts MPRI as well trained the leadership of the Kosovo-
Albanian rebel-force “KLA” (Singer, 2003: 130). 
     US-firm “Brown & Root Services” (BRS) entered the military service market 
at about the same time as MPRI and EO. BRS expanded by recruiting former US-
military officers, much like MPRI, and as well proliferated from the US-defense 
conversion and from the US-military interventions around the world (Singer, 
2003: 136). BRS was an integral part of US-military operations in for example the 
former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan, and in the recent war in Iraq 
(Avant, 2005: 20). Until 2007 this PMC was a subsidiary of the publically traded 
company “Halliburton”. In the latter US-military engagements this firm however 
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operated under its new name “Kellogg, Brown & Root” (KBR). When former US 
Vice President Dick Cheney was the CEO of Halliburton in 1995 he stated: “The 
first person to greet our soldiers as they arrive in the Balkans and the last one to 
wave good-bye is one of our employees” (cited in Singer, 2003: 136). BRS/KBR 
is foremost involved in providing logistical support in military operations by the 
procurement, maintenance, and transportation of military materiel, facilities and 
bases, and personnel (Singer, 2003: 137).  
     During the 1990s BRS was closely tied to US-military engagements in the 
former Yugoslavia. In 1995 this military support services PMC was awarded a 
USD 546 million contract by the US-Army to provide logistical services for the 
NATO IFOR-peacekeeping mission (Singer, 2003: 143). These services involved 
supporting the deployment of 20 000 US-troops in the region, and supporting the 
forces of other IFOR-nations. As the Kosovo War broke out in 1999 BRS was 
employed to provide logistical support for US-troops that were deployed to 
bordering Macedonia and Albania (Singer, 2003: 144). NGOs and other aid 
organizations could not cope with the sudden influx of refugees to these bordering 
nations. BRS was contracted to rapidly build and maintain massive refugee camps 
(Singer, 2003: 144). Notably NATO spokesmen took credit for the aid that the 
refugees received, but, as Singer (2003: 145) underscores, it was essentially a 
PMC that made this humanitarian endeavour possible. After the war NATO 
KFOR-forces were deployed to keep the peace in Kosovo. In only a few months 
and in the middle of wheat fields BRS built and managed two military bases in 
Kosovo that correspond to the size of a small town. For the larger military base, 
“Camp Bondsteel”, BRS provided infrastructure in the form of roads, sewage, and 
power for housing and working buildings, helicopter airfields, a detention center, 
and provided various force protection measures – such as guard towers and 
perimeter defences (Singer, 2003: 145). BRS provided all the food for US forces, 
provided all hazardous material handling, provided all of the maintenance of 
tactical and non-tactical vehicles, provided 90 percent of the water provision, 
provided 80 percent of the fuel provision, and provided 75 percent of construction 
and heavy equipment transfers (Singer, 2003: 145). BRS was initially hired under 
a USD 180 million contract in Bosnia, but by 1999 the contracting of BRS in the 
region had reached almost USD 1 billion (Singer, 2003: 145). 
  
5.3.3 Security PMCs in Iraq 
 
The third broad PMC expansion emerged during the so called “War on Terror”. In 
this war foremost Afghanistan and Iraq were targeted. Before the invasion of Iraq 
PMCs built and in part operated US-bases, during the war PMCs provided 
logistics, support services and maintenance for advanced weapons systems, and 
during the reconstruction process PMCs continued to manage bases, trained the 
new Iraqi army, and supplied foremost security services (Stöber, 2007: 125). The 
contracting of military consulting and training PMCs and support services PMCs 
in Iraq was a continuation of the US public-private military sector integration that 
had intensified during the 1990s. In Iraq KBR-Haliburtion was awarded contracts 
 
35 
42 
 
totalling about USD 20.1 billion to for example build and maintain facilities, to 
run military base food halls, and to transport fuel and ammunition (Singer, 2007: 
2). These services cost, Singer (2007: 2) notes, about three times more than the 
US-government had spent on the entire Persian Gulf War in 1990. Next to the 
continued engagement of unarmed PMCs the third broad expansion of PMCs was 
signified by the rapid rise of security PMCs. During the reconstruction of Iraq the 
demand for security services escalated and many new firms emerged. The vast 
majority of security PMCs that operate in Iraq did not exist before the invasion of 
Iraq (Pelton, 2006: 107). In Iraq security PMCs for example guard facilities and 
bases, protect convoys, and transport and protect officials and other “high value” 
individuals (Singer, 2007: 3). These tasks constitute some of the most dangerous 
operations in Iraq, and, as Singer (2007: 3) further notes, security PMCs therefore 
“use military training and weaponry, to carry out missions integral to the 
mission’s success, in the midst of a combat zone...”. About 75 percent of the 
security contractors in Iraq, however, are “static” as they work within major 
facilities and bases and never leave such closed areas (Cancian, 2008: 65). The 
infamous incidents and scandals involving security PMCs in Iraq thus are not 
representative of the behaviour and engagement of the vast majority of security 
contractors. Most incidents involving unnecessary and excessive acts of violence 
have been carried out by so called “personal security detail” (PSD) units – i.e. 
contractors that provide “bodyguard” services (Cancian, 2008: 66). Retired 
Marine Corps Colonel Mark Cancian (2008: 66-67) describes the mindset of 
PSDs as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
The rampant need for private security services was the result of political 
miscalculations and a deficient post-invasion plan. The US-administration had 
underestimated the number of troops needed to establish stability after the 
invasion of Iraq (Isenberg, 2007: 83). Senior US-officials in the “Department of 
Defense” expected that the USA would be welcomed as a liberator, that 
government functions would be operational, and that the police would be able to 
provide public security (Stöber, 2007: 124). Instead there was a complete collapse 
of public order and the bureaucratic system. The so called “Baghdad bubble“ for 
security services emerged in this security gap. The independent Gansler 
“To a bodyguard the mission is to protect the principal at all costs. “At all 
costs” means just that; costs to the local populace, to the broader 
counterinsurgency effort, to relations with the host government all appear 
to be irrelevant. If the principal’s car is stuck in traffic and that delay 
poses a risk, then these contractor bodyguards will smash their way 
through the intervening cars of local civilians in an effort to escape the 
danger. If traffic is too slow and that poses a risk, the bodyguards will 
often switch into the oncoming lanes and open a way by threatening cars 
with their weapons. Blackwater, for example, prides itself on never having 
lost a principal. For bodyguards this is the only measure of effectiveness”. 
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Commision (2007: 8), which investigated the US-Army acquisition and 
contracting system, critically stated: “...the Army sent a skeleton contracting force 
into theater without the tools or resources necessary to adequately support our 
warfighters”. The delegation of more power to an Iraqi-interim government and 
the adoption of a new constitution did not halt the escalation of violence. In 2006 
the US “House Committee on Government Reform” revealed that one quarter to a 
third of the reconstruction funds for Iraq had been spent on security (Rosén, 2008: 
85). In this committee concerns were raised that the reconstruction agencies could 
not sufficiently account for the costs of employing private contractors. This 
underlined the lack of efficient oversight and contract management procedures.  
     During this third wave of PMC expansion US-firm Blackwater rapidly became 
a world-leading provider of armed security and tactical military training services. 
During the period 2002-2005 the annual revenue of Blackwater increased by 600 
percent (Cullen, 2008: 245). Erik Prince, the founder and owner of Blackwater, in 
an interview proclaimed that his firm constitutes an efficient and privatized 
solution to wasteful government bureaucracy (Pelton, 2006: 2). Unlike the 
multitude of small-staffed PMCs that emerged during the 1990s Blackwater 
maintains its own training center in the USA with 100 employees. Cullen (2008: 
245) describes this training center as “a 6000 acre facility including 40 
computerized shooting ranges, sophisticated shoot-houses, parachute drop zones, 
a mock village, two mock ships, and miles of driving track”. In this facility more 
than 50 000 people have received training (Wulf, 2005: 177). In 2003 Blackwater 
obtained a USD 27.7 million PSD contract to protect Paul Bremer – i.e. the head 
of the US “Coalition Provisional Authority” (CPA) in Iraq. One year later 
Blackwater operated in Iraq under contracts that totalled USD 100 million, and by 
2007 this firm was employing 845 people in Iraq under contracts totalling USD 
1.2 billion (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008: 12). 
     The UN (2007) has criticized the contracting of armed security PMCs in Iraq 
as “new modalities of mercenarism”. Some security contractors have carried 
heavy military weapons – such as anti-tank weapons – and therefore the UN 
(2007) argues that some contractors can not be separated from active combat. In 
December 2008 the US “Department of Justice” indicted five Blackwater PSD 
employees for killing 14 and wounding 20 civilians in the 2007 Nisour Square 
incident, and for having broken US weapons laws by carrying and using machine 
guns, a sniper rifle, and grenade launchers as private company employees 
(Reuters, 2008). A sixth Blackwater employee pleaded guilty. Employees from 
other firms also engaged in unnecessary acts of violence. Contractors from UK-
firm Aegis filmed a “trophy video” by firing rounds at civilians from the back of a 
utility vehicle and published the video online (Singer, 2007: 7). In another 
infamous incident a supervisor from US-firm Triple Canopy engaged in joyride 
shootings of Iraqi civilians. In a TV-documentary interview (PBS, 2005) a US-
officer stated that the recklessness of certain PMC units had increased the 
hostilities against US-troops as insurgents did not differentiate between 
contractors and US-troops. While the need for security services escalated PMCs 
found it difficult to recruit sufficient personnel (Wulf, 2005: 187). Next to 
regulation and guidelines the conduct of contractors is determined by the vetting 
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process (Isenberg, 2007: 86). Some PMCs mistreated the vetting process due to 
the opportunities to obtain large profits in the short-run and even employed former 
bouncers and regular security guards to operate in military security environments 
(Kinsey, 2006: 107). During an interview a Blackwater contractor stated: 
“Business has grown so fast that the companies are not that concerned about the 
people that work for them” (cited in Pelton, 2006: 94). While the US Department 
of State (DoS) and the Department of Defense conduct background screenings of 
PMC employees such procedures have been particularly difficult in the Iraqi 
theater as most contractors, by far, are not US-citizens: 40 percent are Iraqi 
citizens, and 40 percent are third-country nationals – i.e. non-US or non-Iraqi 
nationals (CBO, 2008: 8-9). To overcome such insecurities the DOD and the DoS 
in December 2007 agreed to develop policies and procedures for the vetting, 
training, and engagement of security PMCs (CBO, 2008: 15). This agreement as 
well serves to establish formal frameworks and common principles for the use of 
force by contractors and to ensure their coordination with military commands.  
     In March 2004 Blackwater was sued in the USA by family members of the 
employees that had been killed by insurgents in the infamous Fallujah incident. 
The family members held Blackwater accountable for having engaged the 
employees understaffed and without the proper equipment (Stöber, 2007: 131). 
The media images and videos that showed the desecrated bodies of the contractors 
that had been dragged through the streets and hung from a bridge in Fallujah 
outraged the US-public. The public around the world, in many cases for the first 
time, also became aware of the existence of PMCs (Wulf, 2005: 177). According 
to Singer (2007: 4) even the US-public is not well-informed about the private 
military industry. PMCs are rarely mentioned in media reports. This incident 
additionally echoed of the 1993 Somalia tragedy. Pelton (2006: 117) notes: “the 
vivid brutality of that attack put many contractors on edge... ...security contractors 
became much more ready to shoot if they felt threatened”. Private contractors 
were moreover exempt from Iraqi law. The CPA established early that private 
contractors would be immune to Iraqi laws and legal processes (Isenberg, 2007: 
85). After the “Nisour Square” incident in September 2007 the Iraqi government 
however revoked Blackwater’s license, and opened a criminal investigation. 
While security PMCs are not the cause of the Iraqi security deterioration the 
“Baghdad bubble” for armed security services and the lack of oversight, vetting 
and contract management had severe political and military consequences. Due to 
the lynching of the Blackwater contractors, Singer (2007: 14) notes, the US-
administration felt “the pressure of the television news camera” and took action 
by ordering the Marines to seize the city. The battles for Fallujah caused many 
civilian deaths, and US-soldiers and marines died and were wounded. In the end 
the battle for Fallujah was also a grave political setback as the US-leadership had 
aimed to “win hearts and minds” (Singer, 2007: 14). In the aforementioned PBS 
(2005) TV-documentary several US-military personnel stated that the events in 
Fallujah motivated the rise of the insurgency, and eventually reversed the US-
public support for continued engagement in Iraq.  
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6 ANALYSIS 
 
The aim of this study is to explore and explain the rise of corporate military 
service provision in our time, and to ground this change historically by exploring 
the economic history of private military service provision. In this chapter the 
above historical findings and the exploration of the post-Cold War rise of PMCs 
are analyzed and interpreted as contractual institutions that have periodically 
changed and conditioned the management and provision of security and military 
force. Since ancient eras states have continually relied on the market to either 
augment or substitute the public provision of security and military force. While 
the state never entirely eliminated non-state violence the sanctioning of non-state 
violence fragmented after the 18th century. Contractual institutions that enable 
states to augment or substitute public security provision re-emerged as the post-
Cold War “rules of the game” changed. Today modern states predominantly hire 
PMCs to augment the regular military and to improve public security provision in 
the long-run. Modern states thus still decide the sanctioning, control and use of 
violence. This is underlined by the formal rules and informal norms that constrain 
PMCs from obtaining contracts that contravene the interests and objectives of 
states. Competition on the so called “market for force” is constrained, and in many 
cases the awarding of large government military service contracts is decided by 
informal principle-agent ties. The wide engagement of PMCs in Africa during the 
1990s is the only recent market for force that bears any resemblance to the open 
and competitive early and pre-modern markets for force. In weak African states 
domestic governments and foreign non-state actors, such as TNCs and NGOs, 
have contracted PMCs to substitute the lack of public security provision in the 
short-run. During the post-Cold War era military privatization foremost 
intensified in the USA, and the dependence on contractors in Iraq, as Kinsey 
(2006: 106) notes, demonstrates the extent of privatized military services in our 
time. In this chapter the competition constraint characteristics and informal 
principle-agent ties, and the military augmenting and substitution service roles of 
PMCs are further analyzed and grounded in these aforementioned main cases.      
 
6.1 Competition Constraints & Informal Principle-Agent Ties 
 
The contracting of private military companies originated in pre-Renaissance Italy. 
The wealthy city-states hired free companies as a competitive military strategy, 
and as an economic productivity strategy in order to alleviate the citizenry from 
military duty. The pre-Renaissance market for force was open to new entrants, 
highly competitive, and engaged many multinational companies. While the free 
companies were difficult to control the principle maintained control by awarding 
contracts to many competing companies and exercised contract termination at 
will. In contrast the so called market for force during the post-Cold War era is 
dominated by a few leading firms, competition is constrained by formal rules 
and/or informal norms, and often the awarding of contracts depends on informal 
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principle-agent ties. The reach and dominance of the pre-modern markets for 
force are not viable in our time. Today modern states maintain and enforce formal 
rules and informal norms that sanction and control the provision of military and 
security services. Only a few companies have for example been awarded large 
service contracts with the US-military. During the period 1994-2002 the Pentagon 
awarded 3061 contracts, but 2700 of these contracts were only awarded to two 
companies: BRS/KBR-Halliburton and “Booz Allen Hamilton” (Wulf, 2005: 
187). KBR-Halliburton has maintained almost a monopolistic position by 
continuously obtaining the US Army’s large contract program – the LOGCAP. 
While KBR lost the LOGCAP to DynCorp in 1997 the following LOGCAP in 
2001 was yet again awarded to KBR (Singer, 2003: 146). The lack of competition 
inherently distorts the bidding process. For example, only about half of the 
defense-contracts that KBR obtained in 2003 – totalling USD 4.3 billion – were 
awarded after competitive bidding (Makinson, 2004). Often public defense sector 
managers thus settle with a monopolistic cost by only contracting one or two 
firms. Under such conditions firms can “low-ball” bids and later negotiate “add-
ons” (Markusen, 2003: 478). To provide taxpayers with the best possible option 
under contractual institutions the public sector typically needs to encourage 
competitive bidding. As Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008: 13) note: ...the Bush 
administration has often chosen to short-circuit this process by using “sole source 
bidding”, claiming there is a need to act expeditiously, without waiting for the 
competitive process to work”. Additionally many defense sector contracts are so 
called “cost-plus contracts” (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008: 13-14). In these contracts 
the firm is compensated for everything that it spends, and it receives a profit-
margin on top – i.e. profits increase the more the firm spends. Under such 
contracts firms are often not incited to perform efficiently. PMCs can manipulate 
their performance and withhold data under the appearance that proprietary 
information needs to be protected (Markusen, 2003: 479). In contractual 
relationships agents enjoy an information advantage over the principle as they 
produce or provide the actual services and/or goods (Drutschman, 2007: 446). The 
principle in turn practises oversight and contract specification in order to reduce 
the agent’s information advantage and to incite contract fulfilment. While PMCs 
do not incur a peacetime cost the hiring of such firms demands the establishment 
of efficient contract management procedures and institutions. Under weak 
contractual oversight and enforcement firms can over-price, contain innovation 
and quality, hide information about true costs, and engage in opportunistic 
behaviour and cause moral hazard problems (Markusen, 2003: 478). During 2005 
the “Defense Contract Audit Agency” in the US Department of Defense for 
example identified USD 1.2 billion of “questioned and unsupported costs” that 
had been charged by KBR-Halliburton in Iraq (Perlo-Freeman & Sköns, 2008: 
15). Establishing or adapting oversight structures and institutions, and conducting 
contract tendering and management always incurs transaction costs. As the 
Gansler Commision (2007: 27) underlines: “Contract management is the essential 
post-award contracting function to ensure mission accomplishment, and to ensure 
that the Government obtains the required work on time and at the quality level 
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called for by the contract. It is also an important control over fraud, waste, and 
abuse”. 
     The contracting of PMCs many times is decided by informal ties between 
public sector and military officials and PMC-executives. Such ties can create a 
“revolving door” between the government and the private sector as senior 
personnel move between the two sectors (Perlo-Freeman & Sköns, 2008: 15). 
These practises can significantly strengthen the lobbying power of some firms. 
According to Singer (2003: 120) MPRI-executives maintain close contacts with 
their former public sector colleagues – usually these colleagues were their former 
subordinates. Consequently MPRI has been awarded several contracts with 
foreign governments after direct referrals from US-officials (Singer, 2003: 121). 
Sometimes the informal ties between a firm and public officials can even override 
formal rules. In 1998 MPRI for example applied for a license to evaluate the 
defense department of Equatorial Guinea and its need for a coast guard, but the 
“Office of Regional Affairs” in the US State Department rejected the request due 
to the poor human rights record of Equatorial Guinea (Avant, 2007: 427). MPRI 
representatives exercised their influence by approaching members of congress and 
the “Assistant Secretary for African Affairs” with honoured former high level 
military officers in order to argue that US-engagement could provide an 
opportunity to improve human rights in Equatorial Guinea and enhance US rather 
than French oil interests, MPRI resubmitted its request and it was approved by the 
regional office, but this time the application was denied in the “Office of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor” (Avant, 2007: 427). MPRI then again 
went back to argue its case to the Assistant Secretary, members of congress, and 
to the officials that had halted the second application. Without adding any new 
conditions to the contract, such as how the human rights record of Equatorial 
Guinea could be improved, MPRI was licensed to undertake this contract in 2000 
(Avant, 2007: 428). While the formal regulatory framework faltered in this case 
the license application process otherwise functions as a constraint, and the long-
term potential of the company to be granted new military service export licenses 
hence depends on the firm’s ability to abide by the formal framework. It took 
MPRI two years to obtain this license. Close informal ties between some public 
and private sector actors and competition constraints on the military service 
market at the same time enables predictability and public control. In the end these 
firms depend on the public sector to obtain large and lucrative (government) 
contracts. While the military security service market in Iraq in part operated as an 
open multinational market with many and new entrants and the awarding of 
contracts did not depend on informal public-private sector ties such open market 
conditions are not viable in most military environments. The contracting of 
private personnel that are not informally tied to the public sector can undermine 
national security if such private contractors are hired to engage in operations that 
entail classified procedures and the handling of classified information and 
materials. Often military contracting procedures therefore are undisclosed to 
prevent the hiring of staff that can cause harm to the state and the regular military.  
     Competition constraints and informal principle-agent ties do not only restrain 
non-state violence within public control, but as well provide governments with a 
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new range of political choices. After all, the institutional framework is as well 
comprised of political structures that influence and aggregate policy choices 
(North, 2005a: 49). Peter Singer argues that military privatization is “...not about 
economic cost saving; it’s about political cost savings. When things go wrong, 
you simply blame the company” (cited in Pelton, 2006: 107). According to Wulf 
(2005: 61) some governments prefer to hire PMCs as firms are only accountable 
to shareholders and the client. Utilizing PMCs as proxy firms to further foreign 
policy interests can reduce political risks and enable the government to exercise 
“plausible deniability” – such as during the engagement of MPRI in the former 
Yugoslavia. UK-firm “Saladin Security” has for example been contracted to train 
Oman’s military forces since the mid 1970s by supplying Oman with former 
British officers (Shearer, 1998: 37). According to Shearer (1998: 37) the 
contracting of Saladin provides the UK-government with several benefits: “it 
provides leverage over the contracting government if necessary; offers access to 
intelligence; and raises the possibility of materiel sales on the strength of the 
advice given by the company”. The delegation of vital foreign policy tasks to 
unaccountable firms, however, “short-circuits” democracy (Singer, 2003: 214). In 
some cases the engagement of proxy PMCs has enabled the US-government to 
circumvent the US-congress, formal rules, and public debates to carry out foreign 
policy goals (Singer, 2003: 211). Proxy PMCs thereby have as well been utilized 
to provide military services to undemocratic countries, such as Equatorial Guinea, 
that by law are not eligible to receive US-military assistance (Singer, 2003: 210). 
While US firms do not exercise combat interventions nor are usually contracted to 
engage in offensive operations the military training and consulting services that 
such companies provide can transform the capability of state militaries or rebel 
forces to conduct or improve offensive military capabilities. An official from the 
US State Department once expressed that the only difference between MPRI and 
EO is that “MPRI hasn’t pulled the trigger yet” (cited in Shearer, 1998: 39). 
Before the 19th century the boundary between state and non-state security and 
military service providers was unclear or did not exist. As Thomson (1994: 19) 
underlines: “Because states authorized non-state violence, it was difficult to 
determine which acts of non-state violence were state sanctioned and which were 
private, independent, or free-lance”. The escalating engagement of PMCs to 
reduce political costs in our time has once more blurred such distinctions. In the 
end the government represents the public, voters, and taxpayers. Merely “blaming 
the company” does not always bring about political cost savings. This was 
confirmed by for example the Sandline Affair in the UK, and the controversies 
and insecurities that developed from relying on security contractors – foremost 
non-static contractors – in Iraq. When state and non-state military actors are 
engaged interchangeably the potential of exercising plausible deniability 
diminishes. In for example both Colombia and Iraq the engagement of US PMCs 
has increased threats against regular US-military forces as rebel forces do not tend 
to distinguish between public forces and private military firm employees (Singer, 
2003: 212). 
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6.2 Substituting Public Force & Security Provision in the Short-run 
 
During pre-modern eras state rulers struggled to control internal order and to 
provide security as a public good. Advanced Roman institutions that enabled 
stability, protection, and property rights withered away with the fall of the 
Byzantine Empire. Corresponding advanced institutions did not re-emerge until 
the rise of the modern state system. The modern state eventually generated 
support from the citizenry, gradually developed institutions and complex 
organizational structures that enabled efficient tax and custom duty collection, and 
laid the foundation for the hierarchical organization and public management of 
armed forces and security. The ability of modern states to control coercion and 
violence did not develop uniformly or rapidly. After about three hundred years of 
modern state-building the state managed to functionally and politically control 
violence and coercion (Thomson, 1994: 11). Depending on the institutional 
arrangements and structural conditions non-state actors were hired to either 
substitute or augment public security and military force provision. Modern states 
for example hired non-state actors in warfare – such as privateers – and even 
provided mercantile companies with sovereign powers. Throughout history 
private military and security service providers recurrently emerged during periods 
of national and international systemic change and instabilities, weak governance, 
and demobilization (Singer, 2003: 38). The end of the Cold War changed the 
international system, global instabilities emerged, warfare and humanitarian crises 
escalated, militaries were downsized, proponents of free-market ideology 
furthered rapid privatization worldwide, and as the superpower proxy support 
vanished security provision in many weak states failed. Due to these global and 
national changes and circumstances the age-old alternatives of substituting or 
augmenting public security and military force under contractual institutions re-
intensified during the post-Cold War era. The augmenting role of private military 
contractors, which is addressed in following chapter section, primarily signifies 
the contracting of PMCs in states that already are able to provide security as a 
public good. Contractual frameworks that serve to substitute the inability of the 
state to provide security in the short-run foremost re-emerged in weak states.  
     Weak states in Africa are undermined by inefficient or absent hierarchical 
public structures, fragmented national unity, and governments are rarely supported 
by the citizenry (McInstyre & Weiss, 2007: 78-79). Holmqvist (2005: 11) notes 
that the engagement of PMCs in Africa is “to a great extent symptomatic of state 
weakness and the failure of the state to provide physical security for its citizens 
through the establishment of functioning law-and-order institutions”. Such 
dysfunctional structural conditions fuelled internal instabilities and armed conflict 
in weak states, and undermined development and economic growth capacities. 
Economist Branko Milanovic (2005: 26) has for example demonstrated that 
during the period 1980-2002 low-income countries lost about 40 percent of their 
output due to a greater incidence for warfare as compared to middle- and high-
income countries. While high-income states can delegate specific security 
provision tasks to the private sector as a long-term strategy, weak states, on the 
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other hand, often look to the private military service market to substitute their 
failed security provision in the short-run. During the Cold War the superpowers 
supported regimes in Africa along ideological lines. The security balance on the 
continent changed when the superpowers abandoned Africa (Ortiz, 2008: 8). In 
this security gap new internal wars emerged and transnational shadow economies 
proliferated during the 1990s. Due to these new insecurities such states were in 
need of rapid support from external actors. Without external support to restore 
internal order African governments in many cases were only left with the option 
of contracting private military companies. PMCs were in essence hired by weak 
state governments as a rapid crisis response. Under such contractual institutions 
PMCs are only able to influence security conditions in the short-run. In Sierra 
Leone EO rapidly forced the rebels to retreat, established stability that enabled 
elections and the return of refugees, but soon after the departure of EO the 
government was overthrown and the rebel forces re-intensified their offensives 
and assaults on civilians. With the departure of EO the military pressure on the 
rebel force vanished, and a new security vacuum emerged. Security conditions 
deteriorated in Sierra Leone and the position of the government was weakened 
during the peace settlements (Shearer, 1998: 68). While EO was militarily 
successful it was not allowed to broker the following peace agreement. This 
responsibility was undertaken by the UN, Côte d'Ivoire, and the British 
Commonwealth. The military importance of EO in Sierra Leone was not 
recognized by the UN, EO was widely described as a “mercenary force”, and the 
lack of contact between the UN and EO, according to Shearer (1998: 68), 
undermined the implementation of the peace agreement. In Africa contractors 
have as well been hired to substitute the inability of the state to conduct warfare 
against other states. During the 1990s Ethiopia suffered early defeats in the war 
against Eritrea, and much like Sierra Leone and Croatia it also turned to the 
private sector to overcome its military incapacity. While Ethiopia purchased 
Russian Su-27 fighter jets it had to as well hire 250 pilots, mechanics, and ground 
personnel (Singer, 2003: 173). Ethiopia in effect leased a small air force. With the 
military expertise and advice by hired former Russian Generals Ethiopia launched 
“Operation Sunset” and swiftly defeated the Eritrean army (Singer, 2003: 173). 
While PMCs can substitute public security and military service provision in the 
short-run the ability of the state to provide such services in the long-run, however, 
demands the development of efficient public structures and institutions to enable 
the sustained management of public forces and provision of security as a public 
good. Sometimes weak state regimes refrain from such transformations as a strong 
public military sector can undermine the regime’s dominance. Tax-collection 
duties in many weak states – such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Congo – have in 
fact been outsourced to private firms (Singer, 2003: 67).  
     In pre-Renaissance Italy the city-states controlled vast wealth in tradable 
capital, and protected their territories by contracting many free companies. In 
other parts of Medieval Europe, such as in France, the ability of the principle to 
exercise control over free companies was more limited during peacetime. The 
companies therefore as well constituted a severe social and economic cost as they 
plundered localities. The resurgence of the market for force in our time has 
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reintroduced age-old private force control dilemmas. Under contractual 
frameworks the agent/firm can abandon the client, or even end up dominating the 
principle (Singer, 2003: 159). In for example Sierra Leone a firm left two areas 
that it was protecting when the violence escalated in 1997 (Shearer, 1998: 24). 
Financially poor states have moreover relied on natural resources to pay for 
private military services (Shearer, 1998: 73). Holmqvist (2005: 14) argues that 
private military interventions can worsen security conditions if the compliance of 
PMCs is conditioned to the access of natural resource concessions. The 
prioritization to secure natural resource industry regions thus can exclude the 
provision of security in other regions of the country. Under such conditions the 
provision of security becomes skewed. During the war in Mozambique UK-firm 
“Defence Systems Limited” – later renamed to ArmorGroup International – was 
hired by conglomerate “Lonrho” to provide security (Singer, 2003: 227). 
Protection was provided in the capacity of tanks, watchtowers, and a 1400 men 
strong militia. In this case the PMC intervention caused negative externalities by 
altering the security conditions in Mozambique. In response rebel forces turned 
their attacks against less protected areas. This underlines the excludability and 
rivalry characteristics of security as a private good. In the wars in Algeria, 
Angola, Sierra Leone, and Sudan during the 1990s the engagement of PMCs to 
protect foreign commercial interests, according to Singer (2003: 227), skewed 
security conditions and increased the threat against the local citizenry. In worst-
case scenarios PMCs have worked on both sides of conflicts (Kinsey, 2006: 111). 
In Sierra Leone a firm called “Lifeguard” provided weapons to the rebels while it 
was hired by mining companies to protect them from the same rebels, and 
additionally Lifeguard was an associate of Sandline International, which, as 
mentioned above, was hired by the government to oust the rebel forces (Singer, 
2003: 158).  
     Financially wealthy states, on the other hand, can employ PMC on a long-term 
basis. As a rare case Saudi Arabia is able to provide security as a public good and 
maintain internal order by outsourcing parts of its national security management 
to PMCs. As Saudi Arabia is financially wealthy it can employ firms in the long-
run and thereby ensure national security. Saudi Arabia however completely 
depends on PMCs for military training and planning, and weapons maintenance. 
Without the planning and organizational support of PMCs Saudi Arabia would 
find it difficult to even conduct simple military exercises (Singer, 2003: 172). If 
these PMCs were to suddenly exit the military capability of Saudi Arabia – as in 
the case of Sierra Leone – would thereby fragment. PMCs thus foremost provide 
variable forms of short-term security and military protection, supportive, 
consulting and training services for the contracting state and/or regime. Without 
structural and institutional developments the ability of the state to provide long-
term public military and security services will fragment once PMC contracts are 
terminated. These practises in turn pose democratic and moral dilemmas as 
oppressive regimes can hire PMCs as instruments to retain power in the short-run 
and thereby suppress popular movements and uprisings (Shearer, 1998: 69-70). 
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6.3 Augmenting Public Force & Security Provision in the Long-run 
 
During history powerful states frequently hired non-state military service 
providers to augment public security provision and military capabilities. While the 
Roman Empire provided security as a public good and primarily relied on public 
forces this grand ancient state also hired forces to augment its military capability. 
For centuries the military capability of France relied on hired Swiss forces. In 
1793 Britain hired 33 000 troops in the war against France (Thomson, 1994: 10). 
The USA for instance hired contractors in the Revolutionary War and in both 
World Wars (CBO, 2008: 13). Military privatization in states that today are able 
to provide security as a public good rather signifies a continuation or an 
enhancement of past practises. In our time PMCs have foremost been delegated to 
augment rather than to substitute the public provision of security and military 
services (Wulf, 2005: 60). In the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s and in Iraq 
since 2003 the ratio of US-funded contractor personnel to US-military personnel 
was 1 to 1 (CBO, 2008: 12-13). In Iraq about ten times more regular US-military 
personnel and private contractors were however engaged compared to US-
operations in the former Yugoslavia (CBO, 2008: 13). Unlike in previous US-
military campaigns the main external support in Iraq did not come from other 
countries, but from the private sector – the so called “skeleton contracting force”. 
The US-funded contracting of PMCs in the former Yugoslavia introduced both 
benefits and obstacles. The hiring of PMCs assisted to reduce the deployment of 
public troops, and firms rapidly responded to military logistical needs and 
material and base maintenance demands. At the same time contract management 
problems surfaced. In for example Kosovo US-firm DynCorp short-changed the 
US-government by employing over-aged and inadequate police personnel on its 
behalf for the UN-peacekeeping mission (Singer, 2003: 153). During the invasion 
of Iraq contractors provided similar supportive and consulting services as they had 
in previous US-military operations. During the reconstruction phase national 
security in Iraq collapsed and complex contract management obstacles emerged. 
The chronic need for security became evident when for example USAID in March 
2005 cancelled two electric power generation programs to pay USD 15 million for 
security at another site (Stöber, 2007: 126). Security PMCs were hired to rapidly 
respond to the deterioration of security. Control and contract management 
dilemmas that usually signify the hiring of PMCs in weak states also surfaced in 
Iraq. While contractors were hired to rapidly facilitate security the Pentagon did 
not scale up oversight, its guidelines or contract management procedures 
(Isenberg, 2007: 91). Security spending soared as the insurgency grew stronger. 
The lack of oversight under weak contract management institutions was 
underlined by the inability of US-reconstruction agencies, according to the US 
“Government Accountability Office”, to even provide information about how 
many PMCs were actually contracted in Iraq (Stöber, 2007: 127). Under these 
inefficient institutional arrangements complex principle-agent information 
asymmetries developed. 
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     While PMCs have efficiently augmented the US-military in the past the sudden 
and escalating dependence on unaccountable and non-static security contractors 
undermined US-military objectives in Iraq. The so called “Baghdad bubble” 
emerged due to the urgent and strong demand for security services, political 
miscalculations, and an unconsolidated supply side (Stöber, 2007: 129). Both the 
public and the private sectors were unprepared for this PMC boom. Stiglitz and 
Bilmes (2008: 12) note that the high pay for contractors forced the US-Army to 
pay higher bonuses for reenlistment. After their army duty had ended many 
soldiers chose to work for the PMCs in Iraq. In 2007 Blackwater and DynCorp 
paid their security employees up to USD 1200 per day, while a Sergeant in the 
US-Army earned between USD 140-190 per day (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2008: 12). 
These market conditions in combination with non-applicable or non-existent local 
and international law to constrain PMCs, and the hiring of many and new security 
PMCs without informal ties to the US-government, and severe information 
asymmetries and insufficient public sector contract management procedures and 
structures consequently were utilized by some firms to maximize profits by 
engaging in unproductive practises and misconduct. The “Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction” even declared that the corruptive practises of 
some private contractors in Iraq constituted “the second insurgency” (Singer, 
2007: 4). Market entry barriers were low, and new companies emerged to profit 
from the new insecurities in Iraq. To overcome understaffing limitations some 
companies, as mentioned above, went as far as to hire bouncers. Although 
established PMCs have introduced beneficial self-constraints – such as training 
and vetting procedures and codes of ethics – these constraints were undermined 
by the high demand for security personnel and the predominant hiring of local as 
well as third-country nationals. Neither reputable PMCs nor US-government 
departments could conduct proper background screenings under such conditions. 
Some Third World countries have no national criminal records. In 2007 the US 
“Defense Contract Audit Agency” before the “House Committee on Oversight 
and Government and Reform” stated that it had identified more than USD 10 
billion in unsupported and unsubstantiated costs from battlefield contractors after 
only having scratched the surface (Singer, 2007: 4). The alleged “grabbing hand” 
of the government in this case paradoxically appears more applicable to the 
private sector. At the same time the developments in Iraq constitute a policy and 
government failure as the sudden intensification of security contractor 
engagements were not met with reinforced contract management procedures and 
structural adaptations by the Bush-administration. The Gansler Commision (2007: 
29) notes: “Army “culture” is focused on warfighting and thus neither recognizes 
the critical and complex nature of contracting nor rewards people in the 
contracting community. Contracting personnel incorrectly have been 
characterized as “shoppers,” by some both inside and outside of the Army (and, 
consequently, reduced in both quantity and stature) as opposed to being viewed as 
true professionals”. The commission moreover underscores that contracting – 
including translation, pricing, acquisition strategy, and contract management – 
must be part of all operational planning procedures within the regular military 
(Gansler Commision, 2007: 21). In Iraq the rules of the games rapidly changed 
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with the escalating reliance on security contractors, but necessary structural 
adaptations to facilitate efficient contract management and enforcement 
procedures and oversight were not implemented. 
     By comparing personnel costs and operational and equipment costs the CBO 
(2008: 16) estimated that the cost of hiring security PMCs in Iraq did not differ 
significantly from the cost of engaging equivalent regular military units. The 
contracting of PMCs however appears more cost-efficient as regular military units 
are part of the permanent military structure and therefore incur peacetime costs. 
From a new institutional economics perspectives such costs comparisons however 
are only partially sufficient. Under contractual institutions the public sector in 
addition incurs transaction costs from contract tendering, management, and 
oversight practises and obligations. Conducting oversight and monitoring 
contracts moreover is particularly difficult and costly in military environments as 
these contracts often are established in highly complex, rapidly changing, and 
volatile environments – the so called “fog of war” (Singer, 2003: 152-153). As the 
Gansler Commision (2007: 27) critically reports: “The inability to monitor 
contractor performance and enforce contracts is a critical problem in an 
expeditionary environment. After the contract is awarded, there are no resources 
trained to monitor and ensure that the contractor is performing and providing the 
services needed by the warfighter. The Commission heard of the difficulties 
associated with knowing whether a contractor had performed at all”. Comparisons 
of personnel costs and operational and equipment costs between engaging 
contractors and regular military units do not reveal transaction costs and therefore, 
as mentioned above, do not demonstrate the actual total cost of hiring PMCs. 
Rapidly escalating the reliance on contractual institutions to augment public 
military forces hence consequently demands the establishment of structures and 
formal rules (and informal norms) to enable efficient contract management. As 
Wulf (2005: 198) notes: “...regulations and control mechanisms for the protection 
and distribution of food, for example yoghurt, and pharmaceutical products, or 
environmental regulations, are much stricter and clearer in many countries than 
the state control of the use of force by PMCs”. The ability of the principle to 
reduce agent non-compliance depends on the principle’s capability and 
willingness to establish contract management and monitoring structures and to 
accept the costs that follow with such implementations (Stöber, 2007: 133). Based 
on the critique and recommendations by the Gansler Commision and due to the 
high number of criminal investigations involving wartime contract fraud the US-
Army is for example establishing a new military contracting command that will be 
run by a two-star general and two one-star generals as deputies (Lardner, 2008). 
     While Blackwater aims to mimic Executive Outcomes in order to open a new 
transnational military combat service market the national and international support 
to legitimize such engagements remains limited or non-existent. Blackwater 
claims that it is prepared to intervene in for example Darfur with a privately 
trained and equipped army with supporting helicopters and cargo craft (Pelton, 
2006: 4). During an interview Blackwater founder Erik Prince expressed 
“...frustration at the complete lack of interest by governments and aid 
organizations in utilizing the experience of a private army to solve major security 
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and stability problems in Africa” (see Pelton, 2006: 296). The transnational 
private military service industry is predominantly comprised by companies that 
depend on government expenditure and by small mobile companies that rely on 
databases to subcontract their staff. The ability of the modern state to decide the 
sanctioning, control and use of force may have changed, but it has not diminished. 
In modern states public forces are not being substituted by private forces. The 
regular military has rather been transformed as an adaptive response to the 
aforementioned new post-Cold War “rules of the game”. This transformation has 
entailed an intensified reliance and engagement of private contractors. In cases 
where PMCs have substituted public military force and security provision this has 
rather been carried out as short-term crises responses in weak states that are 
unable to provide public security in the first place. While the US-Army is 
expanding from 482 400 to 547 400 soldiers this increase in regular military 
forces however has not reduced the reliance on contractors (Cancian, 2008: 69). 
The belief systems of the past and their influence over current choices usually 
condition path dependence (North, 2005a: 21). Singer (2007: 2) reminds us that 
once a path is reinforced it is difficult to alter the particular course: “If we judge 
by what has happened in Iraq, when it comes to private military contractors and 
counterinsurgency, the U.S. is locked in a vicious cycle. It can’t win with them, 
but can’t go to war without them”. To replace military support service contractors 
and security contractors with additional military personnel within the US-military 
is, according to Cancian (2008: 73), not viable without reconstituting the draft as 
such a replacement would demand a minimum of 250 000 new personnel. As of 
May 2009 the contracting of armed security PMCs by the US Department of 
Defense has increased by 23 percent in Iraq and by 29 percent in Afghanistan 
(DOD, 2009: 3). In our time we are moreover entering a new era of warfare that 
will increase the deployment of unmanned weapons systems. During the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 US-forces engaged a small number of unmanned aircraft vehicles 
– so called “drones”. By the end of 2008 the US-inventory had expanded to 5331 
unmanned aircraft systems and held more than 12 000 unmanned ground vehicles 
(Singer, 2009: 105). A US-defense analyst once stated: “We’re using the most 
advanced technology in the history of the world to wage wars and sometimes the 
people who built it are the only ones who know how to fix it” (cited in Singer, 
2003: 64). The dependence on contractors to operate and maintain unmanned 
veichle systems is therefore bound to increase. For humanitarian, democratic, 
economic, and military operational reasons the establishment of new national and 
international regulation and guidelines is necessary to improve oversight and to 
enable efficient public management of private military and security service 
contracts and to delegitimize unreliable private military companies. The 
“Montreux Document” is a vital step in this direction. 
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7 CONCLUDING SUMMARY  
  
The market allocation of military force and security services is as old as war itself. 
Under medieval and early modern contractual institutions companies and other 
non-state actors were hired to augment and/or to substitute the public provision of 
force and security. With the rise of the modern state system the sanctioning and 
utilization of non-state violence gradually fragmented, and the state moved to 
direct and condition the control of legitimate violence nationally and 
internationally. The end of the Cold War profoundly changed national as well as 
the global “rules of the game”. During history private military actors and 
organizations recurrently emerged to profit from the need for security and military 
services during periods of national and international systemic change and 
instabilities, weak governance, and demobilization. The rise of the private military 
service industry during the post-Cold War era as well emerged due to similar 
overlapping trends. As global security conditions changed new instabilities 
emerged, and warfare and humanitarian crises escalated. At the same time 
militaries were downsized, market ideology proponents and state advisers 
furthered rapid privatization programs worldwide, non-state actors proliferated, 
and as the superpower proxy support vanished security provision in many weak 
states failed. Due to these global and national changes and factors the age-old 
alternatives of engaging private and non-state actors to augment or to substitute 
public security and military force under contractual institutions re-intensified 
during the post-Cold War era. Private military contractors primarily expanded to 
augment public military and security provision in states that are already able to 
provide security as a public good. Private firms thus foremost emerged to 
supplement the public provision of security and military services. Contractual 
arrangements that served to substitute the inability of the state to provide security 
and military force foremost re-emerged in weak states that were already unable to 
provide security and military force as public goods. 
     Military privatization is not a historically unique post-Cold War phenomenon. 
The delegation of public security and military tasks to private firms rather 
constitutes an enhancement of previous privatization frameworks. During the 
Cold War for example the US and the UK engaged PMCs domestically as well as 
overseas to protect or to further economic and political interests and objectives. 
Formal and informal public-private sector partnerships foremost developed in the 
USA due to the evolution of sophisticated military technology. Over time firms 
were increasingly delegated to provide various military supportive and consulting 
services in US-military operations, and thereby served to reduce many peacetime 
military costs. While the engagement of PMCs reduced military personnel costs 
and operational and equipment costs the escalating dependence on contractors 
during the reconstruction of Iraq without the implementation of parallel efficient 
oversight and contract management structures amplified transaction costs and 
underlined contract enforcement deficiencies. Due to these negative outcomes the 
US-military is developing new military contracting command structures to enable 
efficient contract management and oversight. The fundamental rationale for the 
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state to privatize traditional military functions is after all the presumed cost-
efficiency of PMCs. Until transaction costs are included in such estimations the 
economic cost-efficiency of PMCs remains highly uncertain. 
     During history states customary authorized non-state violence and delegated 
military service tasks to private actors to expand or to retain political, economic, 
and territorial interests. At the same time these practises and strategies always 
incurred new risks and insecurities as they innately reduced the public control 
over violence and coercion. Today modern states control private military 
companies through formal rules and informal norms, by competition constraints, 
and by informal ties between public sector and military officials and executives 
from entrusted private military firms. While formal rules and/or informal norms 
constrain PMCs from the USA, the UK and South Africa the global mobility and 
operational characteristics of the private military service industry has undermined 
national regulatory arrangements on several occasions. Due to the profound and 
sudden national and global post-Cold War institutional and structural changes 
private military companies emerged in an international legal vacuum. The 
expansion of the private military industry took-off during the early post-Cold War 
years, and was reinforced during the 2003 Iraq War and reconstruction. The 
developments in Iraq demonstrate the extent of military privatization in our time. 
The Iraq case also underlines the connecting risks and insecurities that follow 
from contractor reliance under inadequate national and international regulatory 
frameworks and inefficient contract management and enforcement procedures and 
structures – i.e. fraud and corruption, unaccountability, misconduct and abuse, and 
incoordination between regular military forces and private contractors. Due to the 
US military privatization path – foremost after the Vietnam War – the US depends 
on contractors to operate, maintain and advance its military. Military 
technological advances and the political and economic costs that would follow 
from reinstituting the draft hinder the US-military from diminishing its reliance on 
contractors. To overcome the aforementioned risks and insecurities that follow 
from enhanced military privatization and contractor dependence the US-military 
in response is developing and expanding its contract management procedures and 
structures to improve the planning, integration and execution of contract support 
across the range of military operations.  
     States condition the legitimate control, sanctioning, and use of violence. The 
military service industry is foremost comprised by firms that depend on 
government expenditure, and by small firms that rely on databases to subcontract 
their staff. Combat PMCs have only served to substitute public security and 
military force in the short-run, and the contracting of such firms is not supported 
by the UN or the largest employer of PMCs – the USA. Private firms cannot 
substitute national defense provision because private security is an excludable and 
a rivalled good. Private firms thereby provide short-run contractual protection, 
supportive, consulting and training services rather than long-term and sustained 
prevention. The requests and recommendations by reputable PMCs for 
comprehensive regulation and the commitment of states to sign the “Montreux 
Document” indicates that the “market for force” will be constrained under robust 
legal frameworks to advance the state control over private military companies. 
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